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2Abstract.
This thesis presents new results in the theory of organisation under adverse 
selection, in particular in the theory of informed principal and of collusion.
In Chapter 1 we analyze a simple adverse selection model with one principal 
and one agent. They are both risk neutral and have private information about their 
type. We assume that the type of the principal is correlated with the one of the 
agent. The main result of the chapter is that the principal can extract a larger share 
of the surplus from the agent than in the case where her information is public.
In Chapter 2 we study a model of informed principal with private values where 
the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse. We show that the principal 
gains by not revealing her type to the agent through the contract offer. Moreover 
the allocation chosen by the principal embodies more risk for the agent than the 
standard second best solution.
In Chapter 3 we study the delegation of a production process in a three-tier 
hierarchy. We allow the principal to costlessly monitor the communication, at the 
sub-contracting stage, between the lower levels of the hierarchy. We study two 
possible scenarios, one in which the principal observes the menu of sub-contracts 
offered by the first agent and the other in which she observes the report from the 
second agent. In both cases the monitoring damages the first agent and reduces 
production inefficiency. We then study how the agent can change the subcontract 
offer in an attempt to conceal the information that is monitored by the principal.
In Chapter 4 we study a simple model with adverse selection where one principal 
contracts with two agents that can write collusive agreements. We assume that 
the principal does not know the distribution of the bargaining power at the side- 
contracting stage. We show that the bargaining strength of the agents does not 
affect the collusion proof equilibrium and discuss some possible applications.
To G i a n P r im o , M a r iu c c ia  a n d  M a r t in a
Acknowledgem ent s .
I wish to thank the many people who have made this thesis possible. First of 
all Kevin Roberts, Antoine Faure-Grimaud and Leonardo Felli who have been my 
supervisors during the years spent at the LSE. Their advice, comments and critiques 
have been essential for the writing of this thesis. I also wish to thank Andrea 
Prat who has always shown interest in my work. His time and patience have been 
invaluable.
I also would like to thank Luigi Filippini, who has been a source of encouragement 
since the early days of my undergraduate studies.
I am also grateful to Heraklis Polemarchakis and Jean-Michel Grandmont for 
having convinced me to cross the Channel and come to the LSE.
Financial support from Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Catholic University of Milan, 
Cassa di Risparmio di Piacenza e Vigevano, ESRC, University of Milan, Ente Luigi 
Einaudi and Royal Economic Society is gratefully acknowledged.
I would like to thank Tim Besley and the EOPP group at STICERD for giving 
me office space in such a lively research environment.
Thanks to all the friends and colleagues that have offered me their support dur­
ing the years of graduate school. A comprehensive list would be too long, nonethe­
less I would like to mention Sandra Bulli, Andrea Caggese, Lorenzo Coppi, Maria 
Guadalupe, Barbara Petrongolo and Barbara Verardo. These years would have not 
been the same without you all!
4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 5
I wish to thank Leo Ferraris, who is also a coauthor, for listening to my doubts 
and questions with patience and interest.
I would like to thank two great friends, Oriana Bandiera and Luca Deidda, for 
the support and good advice received during my job-search.
Special mention for Imran Rasul, Valentino Larcinese and Barbara Veronese for 
being great office-mates.
The greatest of thanks to Michele for sharing with me the ups-and-downs of 
being a Ph.D. student.
C ontents
Introduction 10
I Inform ed P rincip a l 17
1 Informed Principal w ith Correlation 18
1.1 Introduction................................................................................................  18
1.2 Related literature........................................................................................ 22
1.3 The model.................................................................................................... 25
1.3.1 Objective functions and information........................................... 25
1.3.2 The principal-agent game........................................................  27
1.3.3 The case of full information....................................................  28
1.4 The fictitious exchange economy and the Walrasian equilibria  29
1.5 The equilibrium in the principal-agent game..........................................  38
1 . 6  A simple example........................................................................................  46
1.6.1 The full information case...............................................................  48
1.6.2 The pooling offer....................................................................... 51
1.6.3 The case of independent types................................................ 55
1.7 Concluding remarks...................................................................................  57
1.8 A p p en d ix ..................................................................................................  59
1.8.1 The full information case.........................................................  59
6
CONTENTS 7
1.8.2 Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium in the fictitious exchange 
economy. ....................................................................................... 60
1.8.3 IC2 is not binding at an optimum...............................................  61
2 Risky Allocations and Risk-Neutral Inf. Princ. 63
2.1 Introduction...............................................................................................  63
2.2 The model.................................................................................................... 65
2.2.1 Objective functions and information...........................................  65
2.2.2 The principal-agent game.............................................................. 67
2.3 Benchmark: the full information allocation............................................ 67
2.4 The pooling offer......................................................................................... 69
2.5 Concluding remarks.................................................................................... 78
II  C ollusion  and D eleg a tio n  79
3 M onitoring of Delegated Contracting. 80
3.1 Introduction................................................................................................. 80
3.2 The Model ................................................................................................ 84
3.2.1 The con tracts................................................................................. 8 6
3.2.2 The timing.......................................................................................  87
3.3 Delegation without monitoring (benchmark).........................................  89
3.3.1 The side contract............................................................................  89
3.3.2 The Grand Contract......................................................................  90
3.4 Monitoring the report.................................................................................  95
3.4.1 Can the agent profitably deviate?............................................... 99
3.5 Monitoring the sub-contract.......................................................................... 105
3.5.1 The agent’s reaction....................................................................... 108
3.6 Concluding remarks.................................................................................... 1 1 2
CONTENTS 8
3.7 A p p en d ix ..................................................................................................  113
4 Bargaining in Side-Contracting 119
4.1 Introduction................................................................................................  119
4.2 The model...................................................................................................  121
4.2.1 The contracts...................................................................................... 122
4.2.2 The timing....................................................................................... 123
4.3 The collusion proof equilibrium...............................................................  124
4.4 Discussion and concluding remarks.........................................................  133
4.5 A p p en d ix ..................................................................................................  135
Bibliography 142
List o f Figures
1.1 Gains from trade in the fictitious exchange ecnomy............................  38
1.2 Set of equilibria of the pooling contract offer game..............................  54




Until the late 1960s firms and organisations were seen as black boxes by economic 
theorist, they were treated as single economic agents with a clearly defined max­
imising behaviour. One cannot say the same about other disciplines like sociology 
and also political science, that have always recognised that firms and organisations 
are very complex entities and by treating them as a single block a social scientist 
was missing in insight and running the risk of not understanding their role in our 
society.
The focus of economic research in the last 40 years has moved forward taking 
a closer look at firms and organisations: by now, organisational economics is an 
established branch of economics. Organisation theory has actually become a very 
complex subject that interacts with many other fields like industrial organisation, 
labour economics and institutional economics. The collaboration of these different 
fields of economics has allowed to give answers (at least preliminary ones) to open 
questions like the determinants of authority in organisation, or what determines the 
boundaries of firms, or how members of an organisation move between levels and 
build careers without using the external labour market.
This thesis belongs to another branch of organisation theory, the branch that 
studies how organisations deal with conflicting interests and private information, 
known as incentive theory or contract theory. This theory recognises that, in com­
plex environments, delegation of tasks is a necessity and that the members of an
10
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organisation may tend to pursue different objectives. The issue of realigning the 
interests of the members with those of the organisation they belong to becomes 
a serious and difficult problem when there is imperfect information about agents’ 
actions or characteristics.
The analytical instrument chosen to study these incentives problems is the 
“Principal-Agent" paradigm. In its basic form, an uninformed party (called the 
Principal) faces a privately informed party (called the Agent), whose information is 
important for the efficiency of the transaction. The paradigm allows the avoid issues 
of bargaining under asymmetric information by assuming that the Principal makes 
a “take-it-or-leave-it" offer to the agent.
We focus on problems where imperfect information is about some characteristics 
of the agent or the technology he uses, the case which is also known as adverse selec­
tion. The main problem when adverse selection is present is how to elicit the agent’s 
private information, which is essential in order to use economic resources efficiently. 
This information can be extracted only by giving up some informational rent to the 
agent, which is costly to the principal. This costs adds up to the standard costs of 
performing a particular economic activity and is the cause of the distortions in the 
volume of trade achieved under asymmetric information. At the optimal second- 
best equilibrium, the principal optimally trades off between allocative efficiency and 
information rents given up to induce the revelation of information.
This thesis presents some new theoretical results in the theory of organisations 
when adverse selection is an issue. These results belong to branches that have 
modified slightly the standard principal-agent model to be able to describe more 
complex situations often observed in the real world: the theory of informed principal 
and the theory of collusion in organisation.
Part I presents two results in the theory of informed principal, which studies 
strategic interactions between two privately informed players, one of which (the
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Principal) is assumed to have all the bargaining power when making a contract offer 
to the other one (the Agent).
This branch of information economics has been somehow neglected by most of 
the contract theory literature, the adverse selection one in particular, that uses 
the above mentioned Principal-Agent paradigm, where only the agent has private 
information, while the party that designs and proposes the contract is assumed to 
be uninformed.
Nonetheless many economic situations really fit in the double-sided asymmetric 
information setup that we are studying. With this we mean that, quite often, both 
parties involved in an economic relationship possess private information that is rel­
evant to carry out a profitable transaction. We can find these situations almost in 
any field studied so far by contract theory including procurement settings, regulation 
problems, provision of public goods by the government or even in simple monopolist 
problems.
We believe that studying informed principal problems is quite interesting also be­
cause some of the insights provided by the standard principal-agent models no longer 
hold when double-sided asymmetric information is taken into account. This should 
help a deeper understanding of established theories by highlighting the robustness 
of some results or the weakness of others.
Informed principal problems are in general more complicated that the standard 
one-sided models because an informed principal, besides providing the right incen­
tives to the agent, has to manage her private information in an optimal way.
In simple words, the principal has to decide what to do with her private informa­
tion. She can either reveal it at the beginning through the contract offer, but then 
this is to be done in an incentive compatible way, or conceal it till a later stage, but 
then she has to be careful because any action that she takes during the game can 
signal something about her type to the agent.
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A more complete review of the brief literature on the theory of informed principal 
is presented in the Introduction to Chapter 1, but here it is worth mentioning that 
we fall in the stream of literature which has begun with the seminal works by Maskin 
and Tirole [1990, 1992] that have set the basis for the non-cooperative analysis of 
informed principal problems.
The most related to this work is Maskin and Tirole [1990] where they study the 
private values framework, a model where the type of the principal does not directly 
influence the utility function of the agent. They assume that types are independently 
distributed and that payers have generic utility functions. They prove that the 
principal gains by not revealing her type through the contract offer and by waiting 
until a later stage to reveal it, simultaneously with the agent, right before contracts 
axe implemented. Towards the end of the paper, they show that this gain disappear 
when both the principal and the agent have quasilinear utility functions.
In Chapter 1 of this thesis we analyse a simple two-sided adverse selection model 
with one principal and one agent. Both are risk neutral and have private information 
about their type. We also assume that the private information of the principal is 
correlated with the one of the agent. The main result of the chapter is that the 
principal can extract a larger share of the surplus from the agent if she does not 
reveal her type through the contract offer. The principal can design such a contract 
because she exploits the fact that her type is an informative signal on the agent’s 
one. We fully characterise the equilibrium of the principal agent game in which 
different types of principal offer the same menu of contracts that leave the agent 
uninformed about the principal’s type. This gives more freedom to the principal 
when setting the transfers, because the agent’s constraints need to hold only at an 
interim stage. The principal gains from a peculiarity of the correlated environment: 
different types of agent have different beliefs about the probability distribution over 
the states of the world.
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In the Chapter 2 we study a model of informed principal with private values 
where the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse and types are inde­
pendently distributed. We show that the principal, regardless of her type, gains by 
not revealing her type to the agent through the contract offer. Moreover the allo­
cation chosen by the principal embodies more risk for the agent than the standard 
second best solution. In other words the optimal contract will result in an equi­
librium allocation that involves a larger spread in the ex-post payoffs of the agent, 
forcing him to take up more risk when he accepts the contract.
We believe this is one example of the failure of some of the usual features of the 
one sided standard screening models when double sided asymmetric information is 
introduced. A risk neutral informed principal does not reduce any longer the risk 
that a risk averse agent has to face and the risk aversion of the agent plays a role on 
the solution of the trade-off between rents and incentives that defines the downward 
distortions in the physical production.
Part II moves away from the two players setting and studies frameworks where 
there are one principal and two agents and where it is assumed that agents can 
write binding agreements between themselves. They do it either because they collude 
against the principal, and try to jointly manipulate their reports, or because one has 
been put in charge of contracting with the other by the principal. The contracting 
between the agents is therefore “allowed” by the principal (delegation), but then the 
incentives to lie for the agent that directly deals with the principal are very similar 
to those present in a collusion framework.
In both collusion and delegation framework the principal needs to give incentives 
to coalitions of agents and not only to the single agents separately. This generally 
involves giving up more informational rents than when agents cannot write contracts 
between themselves and distorting production even more than in the second best.
This field of contract theory is also relatively recent and has borrowed ideas from
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the fields of economic and labour sociology. They had long recognised that members 
of organisations and hierarchies can form easily either vertical or horizontal “cliques" 
that can weaken the functioning of organisation itself. This work is in the stream 
of literature on collusion and delegation in hierarchies which started with Tirole 
[1986]1, who gave a clear cut to the way in which organisations and hierarchies were 
studied in economic theory. A distinctive feature, is that organisations are no longer 
considered as single blocks, but like networks of overlapping and nested principal- 
agent relationships where coalition formation and side-contracting are allowed.
In Chapter 3 we study the delegation of a production process in a three-tier 
hierarchy. The principal contracts directly only with the agent that produces the 
final good, leaving him in charge of the contract for the production of the inter­
mediate good. Both agents have private information about their marginal costs of 
production. Delegation reduces the burden of communication on the principal but 
on the other hand it also introduces additional incentives problems and costs due 
to the loss of control over lower levels of the hierarchy. The principal can then try 
to reduce these costs by regaining some control over the “subordinates”, one way to 
do so is monitoring these delegated relationships to acquire information.
We study two possible scenarios, one in which the principal observes the menu 
of sub-contracts offered by the first agent and the other in which she can observe the 
report from the second agent to the first one. In both cases, the monitoring damages 
the first agent who, as a consequence, reacts by modifying his sub-contracts in such a 
way that the principal’s benefit from monitoring is greatly reduced or even nullified.
Finally, in Chapter 4 we study a simple model with adverse selection where one 
principal contracts with two agents that can write collusive agreements. We assume 
that the principal does not know the distribution of the bargaining power at the 
side-contracting stage.
1On collusion in hierarchies see also Tirole [1992] and Laffont and Martimort [1997, 2000].
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The main result of the chapter is that bargaining powers are irrelevant, and their 
possible diversity, joint with the fact that the principal is uninformed about them 
do not affect the collusion proof equilibrium allocation. This result owes to the fact 
that the information about the two agents’ types, and its transmission, is all that 
matters: the difference in bargaining power does not affect that information. We 
show that a Weak Collusion Proofness Principle still holds and that the constraints 
that ensure the equilibrium collusion proofness do not depend from the bargaining 
power at the collusive stage. Therefore, any distortion and asymmetry that may 
be present at the side-contracting stage disappears in the optimal collusion proof 





Informed Principal w ith  
Correlation
1.1 Introduction.
Most of the mechanism design theory is built around the hypothesis that there is an 
uninformed party (the principal) that contracts with an informed party (the agent). 
The principal offers a contract that the agent accepts or rejects, therefore the main 
problem for the principal is to find the optimal contractual way to elicit the agent’s 
private information. Although this paradigm has been applied to many different 
contexts and has proved itself to be quite powerful in explaining many economic in­
teractions, in some circumstances, the assumption of one-sided private information 
is sometimes restrictive. One example is the provision of a public good, where usu­
ally the lack of information rests with the government (principal) regarding citizens 
(agents) private evaluations. However it is likely that the government possesses su­
perior information about the cost of supplying the good. Also in a regulated market 
the authority (principal) may have private information about the market demand 
for the regulated good even if it does not know the costs incurred by the firms
18
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(agents). Finally, a discriminating monopolist may have private information about 
the quality of the good it provides. In all these situations we face what is known in 
the literature as an “informed-principal” problem.
Once we assume double sided private information the problem that an informed 
principal has to solve is considerably more complicated. Rent extraction is not 
anymore the only worry when designing a contract, a principal has some private 
information that needs to be managed optimally. She has to decide whether to make 
it public, and, if so, she has to do it in a credible way. Interestingly, a principal might 
be worse off by having this private information; in fact in some circumstances she 
may not be able to use it to her benefit. The main problem in this respect comes 
from the signalling content that any action taken by the principal may have for the 
agent.
In this work we analyze a simple two sided adverse selection model with one 
principal and one agent. They both have private information about their types 
and a type-dependent quasilinear utility function. We also assume that the private 
information of the principal is correlated with the one of the agent. In other words 
after observing her private information the principal updates her beliefs on the agent 
characteristics. The same is true for the agent.
The main result of the paper is that the principal can extract a larger share of the 
surplus from the agent than in the case where her information is public. Intuitively, 
the principal can design such a contract because she exploits the fact that her type 
is an informative signal of the agent’s one.
The existing literature, in particular Maskin and Tirole [1990], has explored this 
problem in details focusing on the risk sharing benefits to the principal of hiding 
her private information. They propose the interpretation of this principal-agent 
game as a fictitious exchange economy where the different types of principal trade 
the slackness on the agent’s constraints. They show that there exists a Walrasian
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equilibrium of this economy and the main reason driving this exchange is risk sharing.
Different types of principal have different attitudes with respect to the risk of 
facing a “bad” type agent, therefore some arbitrage is mutually beneficial. Hence 
when the principal is risk averse there exists a strict gain from trade among the 
different types of principal. If the principal reveals her type when offering the con­
tract, then the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints have 
to be satisfied for each type and hence no risk sharing possibility arises. If, instead, 
a risk averse principal hides her private information then she can capture the gains 
of sharing risk with other types of principal. Clearly, if the principal is risk neutral 
those gains are not present and hence there is no gain from hiding her type. It is 
for this reason that in their framework when the utility functions of both parties axe 
assumed to be quasilinear there is no possibility of obtaining a higher payoff: if the 
different types of principal are risk neutral, they do not benefit from any risk-sharing 
activity.
In this paper we depart from this analysis by assuming that the principal is risk 
neutral and that her private information is correlated with the one of the agent. 
Obviously, in this case, there exist no gains from risk sharing. However, we show 
the principal can still gain from hiding her private information.
Since at the initial stage the agent remains uninformed about the principal’s type, 
his constraints will have to hold only in expectation and this gives more freedom 
to the principal who can gain by relaxing these constraints in some states of the 
world. The peculiarity of this correlated environment is that even if the principal 
is risk neutral the relative costs of satisfying the agent’s constraints is different 
across types of principal. When there is correlation even if principals of every type 
are all risk neutral the marginal rate of substitution between different states of 
the world is different across types, so there exists a relative price that makes the 
exchange beneficial. Obviously the principals do not trade to share risk, they trade
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because one values relatively more the slack on a constraint than the other does. In 
other words there exist market prices such that the principals buy something on the 
market that is cheaper than their private evaluation and sell something that they 
value relatively less than the market. In this way they can save on the transfers 
given to the agent.
This can be best seen in the characterisation of the equilibrium of the principal 
agent game when we show that if both types of principal make the same contract 
offer, they achieve a higher payoff since they manage to reduce the transfers, while 
the physical allocation remains the same. As a consequence the informational rent 
of the agent is reduced in favor of an increase in the expected payoff of the principal, 
who is able to extract more surplus.
We are certainly not the first to suggest that a principal that exploits the infor­
mativeness of a private information of individuals, other that the agent, can reduce 
the rent transferred to the agent (Cramer and McLean [1985,1988], McAfee and 
Reny [1992]). In particular these papers show that an uninformed principal facing 
many privately informed agents, whose types are correlated, can design a mecha­
nism that extracts all the surplus from the agents. The principal can then achieve 
the first best because there is no more need to trade off rents with efficiency. The 
mechanism uses a sort of yardstick competition among the agents created by con­
structing lotteries that consist of payments conditional of the announcements of 
the other agents. The key difference between these papers and our analysis is in the 
incentive compatibility constraints for the various types of the principal. Indeed, the 
principal’s information in our framework is private to her. This implies that any use 
the principal makes of this information in the optimal mechanism has to be incentive 
compatible. Satisfying these incentive compatibility constraints introduces an extra 
degree of complexity in our analysis and prevents the principal form extracting all 
the surplus form the agent as in Cremer and McLean [1985,1988] and McAfee and
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Reny [1992],
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 1.2 we discuss the literature 
on informed principal. In Section 1.3 we present the setup, we discuss the structure 
of the game and we study the benchmark of full information. In Section 1.4 we 
show that in our fictitious exchange economy there exists a set of equilibria that 
Pareto dominates the full-information outcome. In Section 1.5 we characterise the 
equilibrium of the principal-agent game. In Section 1.6 we present an example where, 
we believe, it is possible to appreciate the main results in a concise and transparent 
way. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Related literature.
The pioneering work in this field is Myerson [1983], where the analysis encompasses 
both cooperative and non-cooperative approaches. The author lays down an ax­
iomatic theory and defines which conditions an “inscrutable” mechanism needs to 
satisfy to be a reasonable selection for all the principal’s types (“unblocked mecha­
nism”).
The papers that are closer to our work axe Maskin and Tirole [1990,1992] that 
provide a full analysis of the non-cooperative theory of informed principal. Their 
first article studies what they have defined as the private values model, where the 
players have generic utility function and the type of the principal is not an argument 
of the agent’s utility function, while in the second one, the common values model, the 
principal’s type directly affects the agent’s utility. Both models address the same 
question, but the distinction between private and common values has important 
consequences on the characteristics of the equilibrium contract. In both papers they 
study whether it is possible to achieve a Pareto efficient equilibrium from the point of 
view of all the types of principal. For this reason it is important to understand what 
is incentive compatible for the principal; unlike in other studies, here the principal
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is unable to commit, so that all the revealed information will have to satisfy some 
truthtelling condition. Then it will be fundamental to understand at what stage it 
is better for the principal to reveal her information.
The private values case (which fits the public good and the regulation examples) 
is much simpler to analyze. The main feature is that the optimal contract that each 
type of principal would offer in the case her type was publicly known (defined as the 
full information case)  is incentive compatible and represents the lower bound to the 
expected payoff of the principal. The idea is to see whether the principal can secure 
herself a higher payoff when she has private information about her type. Their 
results prove that indeed this is possible, and that it is generically Pareto efficient 
for all types of principal to offer the same menu of contracts, in such a way that 
the agent does not learn anything from the offer and the principal gains by pooling 
his incentive and participation constraints. Signalling is not an issue because the 
different types of principal are not in “competition” with each other when dealing 
with the agent.
When we axe dealing with a common values environment (the case of the dis­
criminating monopolist falls in this category) some complications arise. First of all 
the type of the principal directly affects the utility function of the agent and there­
fore now there exist good and bad types of principal from the point of view of the 
agent. The agent can in fact be damaged by the principal’s private information and 
as a consequence the full information contract may not be incentive compatible for 
all types of principal. It will be the case that bad types can gain from claiming to 
be good types. It is clear that there is some form of competition among the differ­
ent types of principal and risk sharing is no longer the driving force in this kind of 
models. The main issue is signalling and Maskin and Tirole [1992] show that the 
equilibria in such framework will not necessarily be Pareto efficient.
Our setup clearly bears some similarities with the framework analyzed by Maskin
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and Tirole [1990], which are worth discussing, to understand the different forces 
driving somewhat similar results. First of all we assume private values and this 
means that the full-information allocation is incentive compatible for all the different 
types of principal. This has strong consequence of avoiding rivalry across principals. 
In the standard model with uncorrelated private types, the only link between the 
agent and the principal is provided by the contract which is contingent on both 
types. In our case, though, correlation of types creates some other connection in 
that one’s type is informative on the other party’s type. Still this does not make it 
a common values model, because each player remains directly affected only by his 
own private information. In common values the agent’s utility function depends on 
the principal’s type but not vice-versa, in our framework the new link created by 
correlation is perfectly symmetric: in the same way as the principal receives a signal 
on the agent’s type so does the latter.
As mentioned in the introduction above, our work is related to the literature 
on mechanism design in the presence of correlated signals: Cramer and McLean 
[1985,1988], McAfee and Reny [1992] and Riordan and Sappington [1988]. Cremer 
and McLean [1985,1988] show that the principal can exploit the correlation of the 
agents’ types and construct a mechanism which extracts all the agents’ informational 
rents and achieves the complete information optimum. McAfee and Reny [1992] 
bring the analysis a step further by proving that the surplus extraction results hold 
in many mechanism design environments and also that the same results apply when 
the private information of the agents belongs to a continuum set. Finally Riordan 
and Sappington [1988] show that a principal can achieve the first best outcome if 
she can condition a contract on a signal correlated to the type of the agent and that 
will be made public ex-post.
The difference is that, in all these papers, the additional correlated signal is 
either known and verifiable at an ex-post stage (Riordan and Sappington [1988])
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or is private information of other agents (Cremer and McLean [1985,1988], McAfee 
and Reny [1992]) but it is not private information of the principal. This implies 
that “...the principal is able to use the information that the buyers have about each 
other as if it were his own. . . ” 1 without worrying about the principal’s incentives to 
report her private information correctly. Unfortunately, as discussed above, this is 
not true in our framework and therefore the optimal mechanism we derive cannot 
extract the whole of the agent’s surplus, or implement the first best.
1.3 The model.
We are going to compare our analysis to the results of Maskin and Tirole [1990] and 
also use some of their results, therefore the set-up and the notation will be kept as 
close as possible to the ones in their contribution.
1.3.1 O b jective  fu nctions and inform ation .
There are two players, a principal and an agent. The principal has a quasi-linear 
utility function V % =  4>l (y) — t, where y is an observable and verifiable action, t 
is a monetary transfer from the principal to the agent, and i is a parameter that 
represents the principal private information or type. (f>% (•) is continuous, increasing 
and concave in y.
The agent has a quasi-linear utility function Uj = t — 'ipj (y), where j  represents 
the agent’s type. It is worth noting that U does not depend from j ,  the principal’s 
private information, this assumption is important and places our model in the private 
values framework, ipj (•) is increasing and convex in y. Moreover we assume that Uj 
decreases with j ,  this means that:
i>i (y) < ^2 (y) for a11 V‘
^rfemer J. and R.P.McLean (1985), pg.346.
CHAPTER 1. INFORMED PRINCIPAL WITH CORRELATION  26
Moreover for all y .
The agent’s reservation utility is normalised to zero.
This abstract set-up fits well the following real world situation: a buyer (the 
principal), with private information about her preferences for a good, offers a con­
tract to a seller (the agent), that produces the good and has private information 
about his production costs. In that case y  will be the quantity sold and t  the price 
paid by the buyer.
In what follows we may use fij to indicate the pair (y, t )  selected by the mecha­
nism when the principal is of type i  and the agent of type j .
To guarantee the existence of equilibrium, we assume that the feasible actions 
and transfers lie in compact and convex sets.
The parameters i  and j  are drawn from a joint discrete distribution which is 
common knowledge. We suppose that each parameter can assume only two values, 
therefore there are only four possible states of the world. The Principal’s prior beliefs 
about the joint distribution of types are:
P n  = Pr ( i  = l , j  =  1)
P12 =  Pr ( i  = l , j  = 2)
P21 = P r ( i  = 2, j  =  1)
P22 = Pr ( i  = 2 J  = 2)
The agent’s prior beliefs are identical to those of the principal and denoted by
7Tij.
We then define p  =  P11P22 ~  P12 7  ^ 0 as the correlation coefficient between the 
two player’s information, when it is positive it means that it is relatively more likely 
that they are of the same type, when negative “mixed” pairings are more likely. For
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simplicity we also assume pi2 = P2 i-
We are therefore assuming that each player’s type is an informative signal of 
the other’s type. As a consequence conditional distribution of the agent’s type are 
different for the two types of principal, the same is true for the agent.
As in Maskin and Tirole the limitation on the possible types for the players is 
not essential but simplifies the analysis and favors the intuition of the results.
1.3.2 T h e principal-agent gam e.
The timing of the principal-agent game is as follows:
1. The principal proposes a mechanism in the feasible set M  to the agent. A 
mechanism m  in M  will specify i) a set of possible messages for each party and 
ii) for each pair of messages chosen simultaneously an allocation (y, t). Note 
that the set M  includes the set of direct revelation mechanisms in which parties 
simultaneously announce their types, by invoking the revelation principle for 
Bayesian game we can restrict the attention to direct truthful mechanisms. 2
2. The agent updates his prior (if he has learned something from the offer)3, 
accepts or refuses the contract offered. If he refuses both players get zero 
utility and the game ends. If the agent accepts, the principal updates her 
beliefs, and the parties move to the last stage of the game.
3. Both parties announce their types and the proposed mechanism is imple­
mented.
We will study the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the overall game.
2 In this framework (as in Maskin and Tirole [1990]) the principle states that for any mechanism 
and for given beliefs any equilibrium of the mechanism is equivalent to an equilibrium of a direct 
revelation mechanism in which types are truthfully announced.
3 We are denote by •k ij the updated beliefs of the agent
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1.3 .3  T h e  case  o f  fu ll in fo rm a tio n .
As a benchmark we study the equilibrium when the principal’s information is com­
mon knowledge. Maskin and Tirole call it the full information case (even if the 
principal does not know the agent’s type) and it is nothing more than the standard 
screening model.
We know from the revelation principle that every equilibrium allocation of this 
game can be obtained as an equilibrium of a direct truthful mechanism. The 
outcome that will be implemented in equilibrium will have to satisfy two types 
of constraints individual rationality and incentive compatibility.
For every i the participation constraints are: Uj (f1) )  > 0 for j  =  1,2. While 
the truthtelling constraints are: Uj (jij ) > Uj (/4 ) for all j,k .
Standard arguments apply, and in this context only two constraints are binding, 
the participation constraint of type 2  and the incentive compatibility of type 1 .
Therefore in the case of full information a principal of type i proposes a contract 
{ / 4  that solves the following program:
(**)
max PijV1 (/A) such that 
i v JJ
IB*: U2 ( 4 )  >  0 (pj)
 ^ IC*: UX (/4) >  Vi 0 4 ) ( ? )  ,
where p% and 7 * are the Lagrange multipliers for the IB, and IC constraints. 
Given the specific functional forms chosen for the utility functions of the two 
players we can actually find the precise solution to this problem.
A principal of type i will offer the following decreasing schedule of output and 
the respective transfers, {yn,yi2 , tn , t i 2 ):
4 A more detailed solution of the full-information problem can be found in the Appendix.
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4>1' fo il)  =  V4 f o i l )  and tn  =  Vh fo i l )  +  (v>2 fo i2) -  V>i fo i2))  
f t '  foi2) =  V>2 fo i2) +  —  (V>2 foi2) -  Tp'l fo i2 ))  and t i2 = Tp2 foi2) •
Pi2
As one could expect, the solution preserves standard characteristics like the “no 
distortion at the top” property and no informational rent for the “bad” agent.
For future reference denote by (/?, p1, 7 1) the solution to the full information 
program (F*) and let v1 =  YljPjV* (j^j) tyPe * principal’s payoff.
Moreover at the full-information allocation the ratios of the Lagrange multipliers 
of the two types of principal are different (p- =  ^  g- =  meaning
that the relative cost of fulfilling the individual rationality and incentive compati­
bility constraint is not the same across principals. This fact is going to be extremely 
important to prove the results in what follows.5
A feature, common to all the private values models, is that, regardless of the 
agent’s information about the principal’s type, v1 provides a lower bound to the 
type i principal’s equilibrium payoff. This means that the full information contract 
is incentive compatible6 for each type of principal. We are going to show that it is 
possible to find equilibria that improve on this payoff.
1.4 The fictitious exchange econom y and th e Walrasian 
equilibria.
The problem we are studying changes considerably if the type of the principal is 
private information. From the previous section we know that offering the full infor­
5 The ratio of the Lagrange multipliers would be the same for the two types of principal if types 
were independently distributed.
6Each type of principal maximises his expected payoff over the same set of constraints, therefore 
they cannot do better by claiming to be of another type and implement this other type’s contract.
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mation contract is a possibility since it is incentive compatible. Another possibility 
for the principal is to hide his type until the implementation stage, in this way when 
the agent accepts the contract he would not know with certainty the state of the 
world. He would know his type and have a belief on the type of the principal which 
coincides with the prior probabilities if he has not learnt anything from the contract 
offer. We are going to show that for the different types of principal it is possible 
to design a mechanism that Pareto dominates the full information allocation. It is 
going to achieve this by “pooling” the agent’s IR and IC constraints over the differ­
ent types of principal, i.e. by having the constraints hold only in expectation rather 
than for each single type.
This methodology leads to the study of the Walrasian equilibria of the fictitious 
pure exchange economy where the traders are the two types of principal tha t ex­
change the slack variables of the agent binding constraints. When we are in the 
full information framework trade is not possible because the constraints have to be 
satisfied ex-post in every state of the world and slackness on them is not allowed 
(as if markets were totally absent). As soon as the agent does not know the type of 
the principal then his constraints have to hold in expectation, offering the principals 
(the different types) the possibility of exchanging slackness (as if markets were now 
open and complete).
The following proposition7 introduces the idea of existing gains from the trade 
of slackness in our “economy”.
P roposition  1.1 When utility functions are quasilinear and there exists correlation 
between the information of the principal and the one of the agent, there exists an 
allocation that satisfies interim IR and IC constraints for the agent and that Pareto 
dominates the full-information allocation Ji (from the perspective of the different 
types of principal).
7 This is parallel to Proposition 1 in Maskin and Tirole [1990].
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Proof. Consider the solution to (-F2), we have shown already that 2  ^ ^
For an allocation define now rl and c* (/Li2) as the negatives of the slack 
variables associated with the IR1 and IC* constraints:
=  - l /a  (/4 )
=  i/i (#4 ) -  ia  (/*i) -
In particular, r% (/I?) =  0 and c% (jP) =  0; in fact in the full information problem 
the constraints have to be satisfied state by state therefore the slack variables in 
each of them have to be necessarily equal to zero. In case the offer of the contract 
is not fully revealing then, as we said before, then the constraints would have to 
be satisfied only in expectation. In terms of slack variables as we just have defined 
them the IR and IC constraints can be expressed as:
I R  : '%2'Kijr'1 (//?) < 0 and IC  : Y l^ i jc% (a4-) ^  0.
i i
Which says that the negatives of the slack variables need only be non-positive 
on average, and not for each type of principal. More precisely, in the case of only 
two principal’s types, the above conditions are equivalent to:
r 2 =  ancj c 2 _  _ h i c\
7T22 7T12
Consider now the following perturbed version of the full information program:
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max £  PijV* (p j) such that
2
Wi }i=>
u 2 (#4 ) >  ~ r i
„ U i ( i 4 ) > u i ( 4 W
It is evident that the only difference from the full-information program is that 
now there is some slack allowed on each constraint.
Let v\ be the maximised value of the maximand, by definition of the shadow 
prices ~pl and 7 * it approximately equals v1 +  /5V1 +  7 V  for small values of r% and c*. 
Let /z* be a solution to Fj.
Choose negative slack variables (r1, c1) for the type 1 principal; then the slack 
variables for type 2 are defined according to the above conditions. Therefore we can 
now write:
v\ — v1 ~  pV 1 +  7 1c1
2 —2 ^  —2 (  ^ 2 1  1 \ . _2 f  ^ ll K ~ v -  P [ ~ — r L + 7  - — Cl™22 J \  7T12
The left hand sides of the above equalities are both positive if:
p] ^  c1f r  > - p :
_cj. > p2 (7T12)2 
'p 7T117T22
when r 1 >  0  ,
and:
f r  <  - £
a P2 (tT12)2
when r 1 <  0  ,
'A ^ 11^22
We know, from the solution to the full information case, that Zr = — — and’ ’ pA P12+P11
%  =p 2 P 1 2 + P 2 2
P
Z?  and if we substitute these values in the above conditions (remembering
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that the priors were the same for principal and agent) we get that both sets are 
satisfied if:
p > 0  (for r 1 > 0 ) and p < 0  
which hold by assumption.
We have therefore shown that p\  solution to (i7^ ) Pareto dominates the full 
information allocation JP from the perspective of both types of principal, when the 
correlation is non zero. ■
The intuition of Proposition 1 is relatively simple. In the full information case the 
agent’s constraints have to be satisfied for each type i of principal; if we introduce 
a small amount of slack —r* and —c* on these constraints then the principal can 
obtain a payoff
v1 +  pV  + 7 V .
As long as J^TTyr* (/*•) — 0 and (a4-) — 0? then the agent’s constraints
i i
hold in expectation. We can choose ( r^ c 1,/*2, ^ )  in such a way that vl — v* is
strictly positive for i = 1,2. The allocation corresponding to this choice then
Pareto dominates Jl[ .
A useful and fruitful interpretation is thinking of p.* as being generated by the
different types of principal “trading” slack variables. In that case the full information
allocation corresponds to autarchy.
The idea is that if different types of principal have different shadow values for
the constraints that means that they value differently the relative slackness on the
constraints and they can gain from trading it. This means that the two types of
principal have different marginal rates of substitution between different state of the
world, because given their type they attach different probability to each state of the
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world. They are allowed to trade slackness only if the constraints for the agent have 
to hold in expectation which can happen when the principal does not reveal her 
type at the contract offer stage. This amounts to having different marginal rates of 
substitution between two states of the world and not disclosing information allows to 
exploit advantageous trading opportunity, which would be unavailable otherwise.8
This Pareto improvement is available to the types of principal also when their 
utility function his quasilinear and this is due to the correlation between the private 
information of the principal and the one of the agent.
In the quasilinear case when types are independently distributed, as in Maskin 
and Tirole [1990], the ratio of the shadow values of the full information case is the 
same for both types of principal therefore no gain from trade exists in that exchange 
economy. But the equality of these ratio is not due only to the specific functional 
form of the utility function but also to the independence hypothesis. These ratios 
represent the probability of the agent being of type 1 given the type of the principal, 
because of correlation these ratios have to be different for different types of principal.
Therefore correlation allows principals of different types with a quasilinear utility 
function to benefit from the trade of slackness across different states of the world.
In the work Maskin and Tirole [1990] the quasilinear case represented a subset of 
the more general framework (with generic utility functions) in which the possibility 
for the principal of gaining from concealing their private information did not hold. 
As mentioned in the introduction, they trade for risk sharing reasons, so when the 
principal is risk neutral there are no gains to be made from risk sharing. Adding 
correlated types to the picture puts the quasilinear case back in line with their main 
results, even if the motivation for trading is different. The principals trade because 
they have a higher valuation then the market for the slackness they buy, and lower 
for the one they sell.
8 In the literature this fact is also known as “Hirshleifer” effect (see Hirshleifer [1971]).
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Let now V} (rz, d)  be the principals’ indirect utility when there is slack —r% and 
—d  in the agent’s participation and incentive compatibility constraints,respectively. 
Thus Vj (r%, d )  is the value function of the perturbed full information problem (F*) 
we introduced in the Proof of Proposition 1 and that we can rewrite with our specific 
functional form as:
2
max 53 Pij ( f t  (Vij) ~  Uj) such that{VijJij} j = 1
* t»2 -  V>2 (Vi2 ) =  - r %
tn ~  ti2 ~  (ipi (Vil) -  “0 1  (Vi2)) =  -c*
The solution to this problem entails the same quantities as the full information 
case9 but different transfers which depend on rl and cl , namely:
Ui = Vh (Vil) +  W>2 (Vi2) ~  V’l (Vi2)) — rl — d
ti2 = (Vi2 ) -  rl.
By implementing a contract with the quantities and different transfers the prin­
cipal does not reduce the productive inefficiency of the full-information allocation 
(which is nothing but the “usual” second best solution), he just manages to im­
prove his expected payoff by reducing the transfers given to the agent. By trading 
slackness they succeed in extracting more surplus from the agent.
The indirect utility function Vf (r1, d)  already incorporates a maximisation over 
quantities and transfers, we can obtain its specific form by substituting the argmax 
of problem (F*). Since we are interested only in the effect of the slack variables we
9 In fact the quantities are inplicitely defined by:
•  <t>U {V ii)  =  V’i ( y n )
•  <f>1'  ( V i2 )  =  V 4  ( v a )  +  (V 4  ( ^ 2 )  -  i  ( y i a ) )
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can consider as constant everything in the value function which does not depend on 
rl and d.  We can therefore write:
Vi ( r \  d ) = Pil (Ku  +  r* +  d )  +  pi2 {Ki2 +  d )  .
Suppose now that the type i principal can “buy” and “sell” slack in the agent’s 
constraints at prices p and 7  subject to the “budget” constraint that the value of 
the negative slack purchased be non-positive. 10 The principal would then take her 
trading decision through the solution of the following problem:
I max pn (Ku  +  r* +  d)  +  pi2 (Ki2 -I- d )  subject to{r*,c*}pr1 +  7 c1 < 0
We now have to check whether the conditions for the existence of a solution to 
this “consumer” problem are satisfied. The utility functions are linear, therefore also 
concave. Let B l (p, 7 ) =  {rl, d  s.t. pr1 +  7 c1 < 0} be the budget set of principal i, 
the following Lemma proves its compactness.
Lemma 1.1 B % is a compact set.
Proof. By assumption feasible actions and transfers lie in a compact set. The 
function that maps action and transfers, yij and Uj, into the space of “feasible” 
slack variables is linear. Therefore it is continuous and has a continuous inverse 
therefore also the space of r% and d  is compact. Then also B l (p, 7 ) is compact. ■
Therefore each principal maximises a linear (and concave) function over a com­
pact set, then the solution to the program (D*) is a correspondence Dl (p, 7 ) which 
we can interpret as the walrasian demand of slackness of principal i.
It can be shown (the Proof is in the Appendix) that a Walrasian Equilibrium of 
this economy exists and it is a pair of positive prices (p, 7 ) and a choice of negative
10 This means that the value of the final slack “consumption” bundle should not exceed the value 
of her endowment, which for both types is zero since they start from the full information allocation.
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slack variables for each type i such that:
37
YJ'kijr% (/i!) =  0  and ^ 7r^c* (//?) = 0  
i  i
( r \ c l) G D%{p, 7 )
The first set of conditions are “market clearing” requirements, which ensure that 
the average amount of slack demanded is equal to the average supply, i.e. zero.11
In Figure 1.1 we represent our exchange economy in a Edgeworth-like diagram. 
First note that the economy is not represented by a box, this is because there are no 
fixed endowments of slackness. In principle, as long as the market clearing conditions 
are satisfied we can have an infinite amount of slackness (e.g. if c1 is very big and 
positive then c2 will be very big and negative). The indifference curves of the two 
types of principal are straight lines with different slopes, they would have the same 
slope if the types were independently distributed . 12
The origin of the axis is the endowment point, in fact the types of principal start 
trading having zero slackness on the constraints. While the area in the bottom right 
between the two thick indifference curves that go through the origin represents the 
possible gains from trade. That is in this area both types of principal would be on 
a higher indifference curve.
From the picture it is clear that we will have infinitely many possible equilibria, 
all in the bottom right region. To put it simply, we have two degrees of freedom, by
11 This exactly amounts to satisfying the agent’s constraints in expectation.
12The indifference curves of type 1, in the r 1, c1 space are of the following type:
while those of type 2 are:
Ci = _ ( ' 1 + E 2 _ _ j 2_ ' | r i.
V P n  P11P22  j  
If p  =  0 then they would exactly coincide.
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Type 1
Figure 1.1: Gains from trade in the fictitious exchange ecnomy.
choosing a value for r\ and c\ (in that region) then we univocally define the values 
for 7*2 and C2 while the terms of the trade are going to be given by the slope of the 
line that goes through the equilibrium and the endowment.
It can be proven that these Walrasian equilibria possess a whole set of properties 
which carry the flavor of the First and Second welfare theorems, but for all these 
results refer to Maskin and Tirole [1990].
1.5 The equilibrium in the principal-agent game.
In the previous section we have shown that there exists many possible equilibria that 
secure to both types of principal a higher payoff when she is able to satisfy the agent’s 
constraints in expectation. At this stage it is worth discussing the relationship 
between Walrasian equilibria of the fictitious exchange economy and the Bayesian 
equilibria of the principal-agent game. This is the goal of the following proposition.
P roposition  1.2 For any Walrasian allocation of the fictitious exchange economy
CHAPTER 1. INFORMED PRINCIPAL W ITH CORRELATION 39
there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where both types of principal propose the 
same contract and where the equilibrium outcome is this Walrasian allocation.
P roof. Consider a Walrasian equilibrium |( p , 7 ) , ( r \  ci ) i= 1  2} an<^  ^  be the 
corresponding allocation. The equilibrium path is going to be the following: both 
principals propose the direct revelation mechanism /T, the agent does not learn 
anything from this offer about the principal’s type so his belief do not change. All 
types of agent accept the contract and both parties announce their types truthfully 
at the third stage.
To show that this is an equilibrium we proceed backward. At the third stage the 
agent will reveal his type truthfully because is interim IC constraints are satisfied 
by the Walrasian allocation. Because of the property of “no-envy” of the Walrasian 
allocation also the IC constraint of both types of principal are satisfied.
At the second stage the agent will accept the contract because at the third stage 
he will obtain at least his reservation utility.
It remains to show that at the first stage the principal does not want to offer a 
contract other than %. This can be done by choosing the appropriate off-equilibrium 
path strategies and beliefs. These are arbitrary, as cannot be derived with Bayes 
rule. These belief need to be chosen in such a way that if the principal proposes 
another mechanism all types of principal are no better off than with fl'.. Suppose 
that a mechanism m is offered, and suppose that the agent has out of equilibrium 
beliefs such that (irij = 1,7T2j — 0 ), the a type 1 principal will receive at most the 
full information payoff v 1. Similarly if beliefs are (irij = l,7T2j =  0) then type 2 will 
at most obtain v2. From continuity and because % is strongly Pareto optimal for 
the prior beliefs, then there exist intermediate beliefs for which both types do not 
prefer of deviate and offer m. ■
In this section our goal is to characterise such equilibria in the more standard 
principal-agent framework. More precisely we are going to study the contract offer
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that is going to lead to one of those equilibria.
First of all we need to ensure that the agent does not learn the type of the 
principal after she has offered the contract. That is why we are going to look for 
a “pooling offer” by the two types of principal. Pooling offer does not mean that 
in equilibrium different types of principal will implement the same allocation it 
just means the different types of principal will offer the same menu of contracts, 
knowing already that some of them (the ones contingent on types other that their 
true one) will never be implemented. In our particular setup each principal is going 
to offer four pairs, an action and a transfer, one for each possible state of the world 
knowing already that two of them will not be implemented. Offering a whole menu 
of contracts turns out to be a useful device for keeping the agent uninformed.
Secondarily we are going to make sure that the contract will be accepted by both 
types of agents and that it is incentive compatible. It has to be true in fact that, 
at the third stage when the players announce simultaneously their type, the agent 
reveals it truthfully.
Third, we are going to require that the contract is incentive compatible for the 
principal. That is, the contract offer has to be such that each principal prefers 
her possible allocations to the one of the other type. This will ensure a truthful 
announcement by the principal at the third stage.
Finally we want the different types of principal to profit from this game with 
respect to the full information case, that, in a private values framework, constitutes 
the lower bound to each principal’s payoff.
Then, in a pooling offer equilibrium the contract proposed by the principal, 
regardless of her type, will be (yij1Uj)i j = 1 2  such that it is a solution, for i = 1 , 2 , 
of:
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max pij (4>% (yij) — Uj) such that 
{ y i j  M j  } j  = 1 
2
IR 2 : E) *12 f a  ~  ^2 (Vi2)) >  0 
i=1 
2 
(P*) /Cl : E  *il (til -  ti2 -  {'fpi (yn) -  V>1 (Vi2))) > 0 
i=1 
/ c p 1 : J2 pi j  (01 (yij) -  *ij) > E pij (0 1 (y2j) -  t 2j)
j =i j=i
/ c p 2 : 2  P2j (4>2 (y2j )  -  t 2j)  > E P2j {<t>2 (yij) -  h j )
j =i j=i
A solution to this problem is then incentive compatible for the principal and the 
agent and will be accepted by both types of agent. 13 In addition it can be shown 
that the incentive compatibility constraint of an agent of type 2  is not binding at 
the optimum (a proof can found in the Appendix).
After having found a solution to the above problem we will have to check that 
expected the payoff for each type of principal is higher at this solution than at the 
full information equilibrium, that is the following conditions must hold:
M  : E  Pijy l  (Pj) > E  Pijy l  (P>j)
j=i j=i
A2 : E  P2jV2 (J%) > j z  P2jV2 (pj) , 
j = 1 j=1
where Jllj is solution to P* while /Z*• is the equilibrium allocation of the full 
information case.
We are now ready to state the following result, which characterises the equilib­
rium of the principal-agent game.
P ro p o sitio n  1.3 The following strategies are a candidate for an equilibrium of the 
principal agent game:
13 Standard considerations ensure the satisfaction of the participation constraint of a type 1 agent.
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• At date 1 both types of principal offer the same contract rh =  (yij,Uj)i j_ 12 
that satisfies the following conditions for i — 1 , 2 ;
-  4>%' foil) =  i ’l foil)
-  <$’ foi2) =  1p '2 foi2) +  (“02 foi2) -  *01 foi2>)
2
-  £  P i 2  ( t i 2  -  ”02 foi2)) =  0
i=l
2 
-  E  Pil (*il “  -  W>1 foil) -  “01 foi2))) =  0
i=l
• At date 2 the beliefs of the agent are unchanged and all types of agent accept 
the proposed mechanism m.
• At date 3 both parties announce their type truthfully and implement the mech­
anism.
Proof. First note that any contract m  which is a solution to problem (P l) is 
incentive compatible for the principal and agent and is individually rational for the 
agent. We need therefore to show that m is indeed a solution to (P l) .
To begin with, note that m  is a solution to the less constrained problem (P*) 
which is defined as:
2
max E  Pij (0l foij) — Uj) such that{yij,Uj}j=i
(P*) IR 2 : E  'ki2 (*i2 ~  "02 foi2)) >  0 Cpi)
i=l
ICi  : E  TTii (til -  t i2 -  Wh foil) -  ”01 foi2))) > o (7i) .
i=l
Program (P*) is the same as (P l) except that the incentive compatibility con­
straints for the two types of principal have been omitted.
The first order conditions for this problem are:
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=  Pi i f '  foil) +  TTiiTiV'i foil) =  0dyn
jr
7 ^  =  Pi2<^' (2/i2) -  TTilTi^i (2/i2) +  7Ti27iPiV,2 (2/i2) =  0
&L n
=  ~ P ^ ~  =  0atii
dL
n, — Pi2 “H l i^ i l  P%^ i2 — 0 Oti2
dL  2
^  =  E  7Ti2 (ti2 -  1p2 foi2 )) =  0  
°Pi i=1
<9L 2
=  E  TTil (*il ~  fi2 ~  fo 1 foil) -  V>1 foi2 ))) =  0VI i i= 1
From ( ^ f ^ j  and we obtain the first condition which implicitly defines yn,
while from and we get the definition of yi2 - Then ( j j r )  and
give the last two conditions on the transfer. So rh satisfies the first order conditions 
of problem (-P*)-
Now m is also a solution to (Pl) if it is incentive compatible for both types
of principal. To show this first note that each principal maximises her expected
utility over the same set of constraints. Therefore the value at the optimum of the
utility function cannot be higher if the principal then lies and chooses the optimal
allocation chosen by the other type. More precisely, call hfoij,£y) =  0 the set
of constraints of problem (P*) and let foij, tij)  be the allocations that maximise 
2 ^  _
E  Pij (&1 (yij) ~  hj) over h (yij,Uj) = 0  and i^2j^2j) the equivalent for a type 2
j =i
principal. It is evident that the following holds:
2 _  2 _
E  Pij (4>l (Vij) ~  h j)  > E  Pij fo1 © 2 j) ~  t2j) ,
j=l j=l
that is: each principal prefers her optimal allocations to the ones of the other 
type. If they were preferred, they would have been chosen in the first place because
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the set of constraints is the same.
So m  is incentive compatible for both types of principal and is therefore a solution 
to (i*). ■
The last proposition has characterised the strategies which can constitute an 
equilibrium of our principal-agent game. The contract offer is pooling, in the sense 
that both principals offer the same menu of four allocations, this does not allow the
agent to learn anything about the type of the principal he is facing. The actions
prescribed are the same as in the full information case while the transfers are po­
tentially different. We are in fact left with two degrees of freedom in choosing the 
transfers (four unknowns and two equations), one possibility are the transfers of the 
full information case. 14 Our claim is though that both types of principal can do 
better than in the full information case so we can exploit these degrees of freedom 
in the constraints to make sure that the conditions for a higher equilibrium payoff 
are satisfied by the chosen transfers.
Proposition 1.4 Contract fh, solution to (P l), satisfies the following conditions:
Ai : £  PijV1 (£)) > £  PljV l (p))
j =l j =l
^ 2  : £  P2jV2 (J%) > £  P2jV2 (p2) ,
j=l j =l
and therefore is an equilibrium of the Principal-Agent game.
Proof. Both plj  and Jlj prescribe the same actions, therefore the satisfaction of the
above conditions will depend exclusively on the transfers chosen. The transfers of
the full information case are: tn  = Vq (yn) +  ( ip 2 f e )  -  Vh (Vi2 )) and U2 =  Vq {Vii)-
While the ones of the pooling offer have to satisfy the following conditions:
2
£  7Ti2 (ti2 ~  V>2 (Vi2)) = 0
i= 1
14 The fact that the full information contract is still a solution when the information is not public 
is a typical feature of the private values case.
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2
£  7t*i (tn -  t i2 -  i (yn) -  V>i (Vi2))) =  o.
i=l ^
Let tii and be the transfers in the pooling offer ra, the conditions Ai and A2 
then become respectively:
Pll*ll +  Pl2*12 > P ll* ll+ P l2*12
Pl2*21 +  P22*22 >  Pl2*2 1 + P 2 2*2 2 -
Remembering that when m is offered the posterior beliefs of the agent are un­
changed and that the priors of principal and agent were identical, from the above 
equality constraints we can solve for:
*22 =  i>2 (2/22) +  — V>2 (2/12) “  — *12 
P22 P22
and then using what we just found:
*11 =  Vh (2/11) +  *12 -  V’i (2/12) — — *2i +  — Vh (2/21)
P11 P11
+  ^  ( i>2  (2/22) +  ““ ^2 (2/12) -  “ 1^2") “  Z^V'i (2/21) •
P11 \  P22 P22 J  P n
Substitute the values of full information transfers and those of £22 and tn  in the
two inequalities, what we obtain are two linear inequalities in two unknowns:
*21 -  *12 >  Vh (2/21) ~  2 (2/12) +  2A2 (2/22) -  Vh (2/22)
P l2 * 2 1 -— *12 >  P12 (^1(2/21) “ V>2 (2/12) +V>2 (2/22) -^1(2 /22)) - — ^2(2/12) 
P22 P22
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There exists infinite solutions to this system of inequalities, therefore it is possible 
to choose four transfers such that the conditions 7ri and 7T2 are satisfied. ■
This proposition proves that for both types of principal it is possible to do better 
than in the full information case. They can achieve a higher payoff making a contract 
offer that does not reveal anything about their type to the agent. Moreover there 
are infinitely many contracts that allow a higher expected utility . 15
In the case of no correlation all these equilibria would bear a payoff equal to the 
full information one, therefore the principal would be completely indifferent between 
revealing her information to the agent at the contract offer stage or keeping it secret 
until the third stage. Correlation allows to break this indifference.
1.6 A  simple exam ple.
In what follows we are going to apply our propositions in an extremely simplified 
framework and we are going to find a numerical solution so that it is going to 
be more evident that an informed principal can profit from having and concealing 
private information.
One principal wants to sell one unit of a good which he can produce at costs c\ 
or C2 , with ci < C2 - The cost of producing the good is private information.
One agent wants to buy one unit of the same good and he values that unit v\ or 
V2 , with v\ <V2 - The valuation for the good is private information.
We also assume that ci < iq < C2 < U2 , therefore a type 1 principal has always 
gains from trade while for type 2  gains from trade are conditional on the agent 
having a high valuation for the good.
The utility for the principal is:
V  = t - c ,
15 Note that this is perfectly consistent with the result found in the previous section, also here we 
keep two degress of freedom.
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and the one of the agent is:
U = v — t,
where t is the price paid for the good (i.e. a transfer form the agent to the 
principal).
We are therefore in a world of bilateral asymmetric information and our informed 
principal problem falls in the realm of the private values case because the agent 
does not care directly about the cost of production of the good (i.e. the type of the 
principal).
Each player knows only the a priori distribution of the other player’s type. The
two types of the players are equally likely with Pr (vi) =  Pr (cj) =  \  with i =  1,2.
However they are not independently distributed with the conditional distributions 
being:
Pr (vi | q ) =  Pr (a  j vi) = |
Pr (vi I cj) =  P r ( c jK )  =  i
with i , j  =  1 , 2  and i ^  j .
We are assuming therefore that there is higher probability of the two player’s 
being of the same type with one’s type acting like an informative signal on the other 
party’s type.
After learning his cost of production, the principal offers a contract to the agent 
that specifies a price to be paid for the good in each state of the world. We are going 
to show that the principal will gain from not revealing her type at the contract offer 
stage. This means that both types of principal will offer the same menu of four 
prices (one for each state of the world). At that stage the principal already knows 
her type and so knows that two of those prices will never be implemented but by 
making this pooling contract-offer she does not allow the agent to learn anything
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new about her type. The agent will therefore accept the contract on the basis of the 
a priori distribution which he has not been able to update because no information 
has come from the offer. This therefore means that the participation and incentive 
constraints will have to hold only in expectation, leaving therefore more freedom to 
the principal when setting the prices.
At the third stage both principal and agent make an announcement about their 
type, we are going to show that the optimal contract which is also incentive com­
patible for the principal, in the sense that the principal will report truthfully his 
type.
At the final stage the contract is implemented and the transaction takes place 
at the chosen price.
We will also show that the principal is better off when concealing her information 
than in the case she reveals it from the very beginning. Finally we are going to show 
that correlation of information plays a big role in all this by showing that when types 
are independently distributed the principal cannot improve upon the full information 
payoff.
1.6.1 T h e full in form ation  case.
As we did before we are now going to study the contracts when the type of the 
principal is common knowledge, we are going to use it as a benchmark for evaluating 
the gains for the principal.
If the principal has cost of production c\ then she offers a contract which consists 
of two prices, one for an agent that has valuation v\ and one for an agent that has 
valuation V2 -
In order to have a lighter notation, simplify the analysis by making it more clear, 
we are going to assign the following specific values to valuations and costs: V2 = 3,
=  1 , C2 =  §, ci =  0 . 16
16 We chose these numbers in order that the assumed ranking was manatained, in fact it is still
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The prices are determined through the following optimisation problem:
3 1max E (V 1) = - t ( v 1,ci) + - t ( v 2,ci)
t ( v i , c i ) , t ( v 2, c i )  4  4
subject to the following participation and incentive constraints:
IRi  : 1 — t (vi,ci) > 0
I R 2 : 3 —t(u 2 ,c i)> 0
ICi  : 1 - t ( v u ci) > 1 -  t(v2,ci)
IC 2 : 3 — t (v 2 ,ci) > 3 — t(v i ,c i ) .
It is clear that the only way to satisfy the incentive constraints is setting equal 
transfers for both types of agent. If the principal sets transfers:
t(v i ,c i)  = t (v 2,ci) =  1 ,
then she will sell to both types of agent and his expect payoff will be:
E(V i) =  1,
which is higher than what she would obtain by setting the transfers equal to 3 
because that would ensure her a payoff of | 17
Therefore both types of agent consume the good, and the agent with high val­
uation enjoys some rent (he pays a price which is well below his valuation and 
E{U2) = \) .
When the principal has high cost of production, then the two prices (always
true that: c \  <  v \  <  C2 <  • Moreover we wanted: v \  — ci >   ^ (V2 — ci) so that it is optimal for a
type 1 principal to sell to both types of agent in the full-information case. This assumption ensures 
also efficiency.
17In that case a type 1 agent would refuse the contract.
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contingent on the type of the agent) will solve the following problem:
50
£(y) = i(t(U2-C2)- | )+i(t (vuC2) ~  f)
subject to the following participation and incentive constraints:
IR \  : 1 — t (v i ,c 2) >  0
I R 2 : 3 — t(v 2,c2) >  0
/C i : 1  - t  (ui,c2) >  1 - t ( y 2,c2)
IC 2 : 3 — t (u2, c2) > 3  — t (i>i, c2)
Again both transfers have to be equal and since setting t (v\, c2) = t (v 2,c2) =  1 
would gain the principal a negative expected payoff, then this time the transfers will 
be:
t ( y u c2) = t (v 2,c2) =  3.
The principal will sell (and produce) the good only to a high valuation agent 
because the price is to high for a low valuation agent that prefers to enjoy his 
reservation utility. In this case the principal’s equilibrium payoff is going to be:
E {\2) =  | .
Now both type of agents receive the same equilibrium payoff, even if one agent 
consumes and the other not.
Note also that, with the assumption that we made on the parameters, we obtain 
efficiency: the principal sells the good all the times that the valuation of the good 
by the agent is higher than her cost of production.
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1.6 .2  T h e  p oo lin g  offer.
In this section we return to the case of privately informed principal and we show 
that the optimal contract is a menu of prices to be offered by both types of principal 
such that:
• it satisfies individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints for 
both types of agent;
• it satisfies incentive compatibility for the principal;
• it secures a higher equilibrium expected payoff to both types of principal;
• it maintains efficiency (i.e. when the valuation is vi and the cost C2 the good 
is not exchanged or produced).
This menu will be offered by both types of principal so that the agent does not 
learn any information from the contract offer so that his beliefs on the type of the 
principal coincides with the priors. This also means that his constraints will have to 
hold only in expectations (at an interim stage) leaving more freedom to the principal 
in setting the transfers.
At this stage we introduce four new variables qij £ {0,1} with i , j  =  1,2 which 
indicates whether a principal of type j  will sell or not the good when she is paired 
with an agent of type i .
Then the expected utility for the different types of principal is going to be:
E{Vi) = !* (u i ,c i)+  i i ( v 2 ,ci)
E  (V2) = |  ^  ( V 2 y C2 )  -  p 22^  +  i  ^  (ui, c2) -  ,
The optimal contract will be the solution to the maximisation of these objective 
function with respect to t (uj, Cj) and qij provided that a set of constraints is satisfied.
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This set includes participation constraints for the agent, incentive compatibility 
constraints for both agent and principal. Finally we are going to show also that 
the expected payoff when both types of principal offer this optimal contract will be 
higher than the one of the full-information case.
The individual rationality constraints that have to be satisfied are:
3 1IR i  ' j  {qn ~ t ( v u ci)) +  -  (q12 - t ( v u c2)) > 0
I R 2 : |  (Sq22 - 1 (u2, c2)) +  j  (3 ^ 2 1  -  t (v2, ci)) > 0,
The incentive compatibility constraints for the agent are:
3 1 3  1IC\ : -  (gn -  t  (ui, ci)) +  -  (q12 -  t (vi, c2)) > -  (q2 1 -  t  (u2, Ci)) +  -  (q22 -  t (v2, c2))
IC 2 : j  (3 g22 - 1 (u2 ,c2)) +  i  (3g2i - 1 (u2 ,ci)) >  ^  (3 <7i2 - t {vu c2)) +  i  (3gn - 1 (vu c i) ) .
This time though we are going to require that the principal reveals truthfully her 
type at the third stage, therefore it has to be that, for each given type, she prefers 
“her prices” to the ones of other type. More precisely, incentive compatibility for 
the principal requires that the following two constraints are satisfied:
IC P 1 : 11 (ui, ci) +  \ t  («2 , ci) > 11 (ui, c2) +  \ t  (u2, c2)
IC P 2 : |  (t (u2, c2) -  §g2 2 ) + i  {t (vi,c2) -  \q i2) > § (t(u 2 ,ci) -  \q 2 i ) + \  (*(*h,ci) -  fg n )
In addition, since we want to show that the principal benefit from concealing her 
type, then we require that the solution satisfies also the following inequalities are 
satisfied:
3 1
7T1 : - t  (ui,ci) +  - t { v 2,Ci) > 1
tt2 : j  \ t ( v 2,c2) -  2 q22 \  +  i  ( t ( v u c2) -  ^q12j  >
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In other words the expected payoff for each type of principal have to be greater 
than what she could achieved by revealing her information, namely the full infor­
mation payoff we computed in the previous section.
Arguments standard in this literature allow us to solve the programs with a bind­
ing participation constraint of a low valuation agent (IRi) and a binding incentive 
compatibility constraint of a high valuation agent (IC2 ).
As a result of optimisation we find that q\\ =  <721 =  <722 =  1 and q\2 =  0, this 
means that we axe going to observe trade in all case but when the valuation of the 
agent is lower than the cost of production for the principal.
Now that we know the optimal values for the g’s we can substitute them in the 
constraint and from the binding IRi we can derive the following:
t (v  i,c i)  =  l - ^ t ( v 1,c2);
while from IC2 , after having plugged in t (v i ,c i) ,  we obtain:
w  n 1 0  1 , , 8  . .t (v2, c2) — — - t  (v2, ci) +  - t  (vu  c2) .
We can now use these two expressions to simplify the remaining inequalities and 
obtain a system of linear inequalities in only two variables, t (v i ,c 2) and t (v2} ci). 
After the simplifications the constraints become:
t
I R 2 :t(vi,C2) < |
IC 2 : t (v2j c i ) > \ -  \ t  (vi, c2)
IC P 1 : t (v2, ci) >  \  +  ^ t (ui, c2)
IC P 2 : t (U2, C l)  < Y  +  t (v\ , c2) 
7Ti : t ( y 2 ,ci) > 1 +  t(ui,ca)
7T2 : t{v2,c{) < 1 +  (vi,c2)\
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Figure 1.2: Set of equilibria of the pooling contract offer game.
We can graph the corresponding equations (F ig l.2) and look for a solution.
We can see that the shaded area in the graph satisfies all inequalities, that means 
that there exists infinite number of solutions, there are two degrees of freedom when 
choosing two of the prices, namely t  ( ,  c \ )  and t  (vi, C2). The set of the solutions is 
also a Pareto set from the point of view of the types of principal, in fact the expected 
payoff of type 1 principal increase with t ( v 2 , c i )  and decrease with t ( v i , C 2 )  while 
the reverse holds for the expected payoff of a type 2 principal.
We can now pick a pair of prices inside the shaded area and verify that all the 
constraints are satisfied, for example: t ( v i , C 2 )  =  0.6 and t  =  2.7. From the
binding constraints we derive that £(ni ,c i)  =  0.8 and t ( v 2 , C 2 )  ^  2.966. We can 
then verify in Table 1
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Table 1 FULL-INFO POOLING
t{v  i,Ci) 1 0 . 8
t ( v i ,c 2) 0 0 . 6
t ( v 2,ci) 1 2.5
t(v2,c2) 3 2.96
rent A\ 0 0
rent A 2 0.5 0 . 1 0
7Ti 1 1.275
7T2 98 1.249
that an agent who has low valuation obtains his reservation utility as in the full 
information case, while a high type agent enjoys a smaller expected rent of 0 .1 0 0 . 
We also get that IC2 is binding while ICi is not. None of the incentive compatibility 
constraints for the principal is binding and she also enjoys higher expected profits, 
with respect to the full information case, whatever her type. In fact a type one 
principal gets 1.275 while in the former case she would get only 1; while a type 
two principal receives an expected payoff of 1.249 while it was only 1.125 when her 
information was known to the agent. It is therefore evident that by making the 
pooling offer the types of principal manages to extract some surplus from the agent. 
Some Cremer-McLean flavor emerges from the fact that with the new mechanism 
the principal raises the prices in the less likely states of the world therefore reducing 
the informational rent of the agent in those states.
1.6.3 T h e  case o f  ind ep en dent ty p es .
To stress the importance of correlation in getting our result we are going to analyze 
the case in which the private information is independently distributed. We will show 
that even if the principals make a pooling offer she is not able to improve upon the 
full information outcome.
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We maintain the assumption previously made that both types are equally likely 
with Pr(ui) =  Pr(cj) =  \  with i = 1,2, but this time the conditionals distribution
are going to be equal to the marginal ones:
Pr (vi | Ci) = Pr (ci | Vi) = i
Pr (^i | Cj) = Pr(cj | Vi) =  i ,
this means precisely that one’s type is non-informative signal of the other party’s 
type.
The full information optimal contracts are the following pairs of prices and trade 
possibilities18:
t (V2, Cj) =  3 with Q2j — 1 
t (vi, Cj) =  0 with qij = 0,
with j  =  1,2. This time both types of principal do not sell the good to a 
low valuation agent, therefore also leaving some gains from trade unexploited. The 
expected payoff for these contracts are respectively:
E{Vx) = \
E (V 2) = | .
We now study the optimal contract when the different types of principal conceal 
their type at the offer stage. Optimal trade possibilities remain unchanged, with the 
low valuation agent not able to consume the good even when paired with a low cost 
principal.
18These are the solution to the following problems, with i  =  1,2 :
max \  ( t  ( v i , C j )  -  q i j C j )  +  |  (t ( v 2 , C j )  -  q 2j C j )
subject to usual IC and IR constraints for the two types of agent.
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At this stage the constraints have to be satisfied in expectation and if we let the 
individual rationality constraint of a low valuation agent and incentive compatibility 
of a high type be binding we obtain:
t(v i,c i) = - t ( v u c2) 
t(v 2jc2) =  6 — t (u2, c i ) .
If we then substitute this values inside the other constraints we obtain the other 
constraints for the agent are always satisfied while those of the principal become:
IC P 1 : t ( v 2 yCi) >  3 +  t(vi,ca)
IC P 2 : t ( v 2 ,c i) <  3 +  t (ui,c2)
7Ti : t(i>2 ,ci) > 3 +  t (vi,c2)
7T2 : t (y2,a )  < 3 +  t(v i ,c 2)
This time the shaded area where the solution to the system of constraints where 
lying collapses to a single straight line with all constraints strictly binding.
In Figl.3 we can see that there is a continuum of equilibria of the game with 
pooling offer. All of them belong to the same line which is the locus of the transfers 
which leave the two types of principal at the same expected payoff level of the full 
information payoff. We have therefore shown that when types are independent the 
different types of principal are indifferent between revealing and concealing their 
private information because they neither gain nor lose from it.
1.7 Concluding remarks.
In this work we have shown how an informed principal with a quasilinear utility 
function and whose type is correlated with the one of the agent can improve his
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. t(v2,cl)
Figure 1.3: Set of equilibria of the pooling contract offer game when types are 
independent.
expected payoff with respect to the one he would obtain if he had no private infor­
mation. The increase in payoff comes from pure redistribution of surplus that she 
manages to extract from the agent. It does not come, as elsewhere in the literature, 
from the elimination of risk. In this sense the efficiency of the economy as a whole 
is not improved, the principal, however, uses in a more efficient way the tools in her 
hands: the possibility of designing the contract.
Hence we have shown that the assumption of correlation between the information 
of the two parties is of great consequence in a world of private values. We believe it 
would be interesting to extend this analysis to the case of common values for which 
the literature offers less general and clear cut results.
This result could also be applied to the field of collusion under asymmetric 
information (e.g. models with one principal and two agents that can collude by 
signing a side-contract). Previous works in the literature have introduced a fictitious 
third party as collusion-contract designer to avoid problems related to bargaining
CHAPTER L INFORMED PRINCIPAL WITH CORRELATION  59
under asymmetric information and informed principal problems. In these models 
the information is of the private value type and it would be interesting to study 
what would happen to the optimal contract designed by the principal when it is one 
of the agents who makes the collusive contract offer to the other and therefore acts 
as an informed principal vis-a-vis the other agent.
1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 T h e  full inform ation  case.
In the full information framework each type of principal i solves the following prob­
lem:
&
max y^P ij {<p% {yij) -  Uj
{ V i j M j }  “ i
subject to:
U\ ~ 4>i foil) =  U2 -  Ipi (?/i2) 
ti2 -  (Vi2) =  0
Each Lagrangian would then be:
2
Ll = YsP ij (Vij) ~  4u) ~  Ti (^1 -  V’l foil) -  ti2 +  V>1 foi2)) -  pi (ti2 -  1p2 foi2))
3 =1
and maximizing it with respect to yij,tij,^ i and ^  we obtain the following so­
lution:
• <P1' foil) =  V7! foil) and tn  =  tpi foil) +  fo>2 foi2) ~  Vh foi2))
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•  <t>%' t e )  =  V>2 (Vi2) +  (ip2 f e )  -  -01 (yi2)) and =  “02 f e )  •
It is important to stress that the ratio of the Lagrange multipliers (i.e. the 
shadow value of the constraints) at the optimum is different across principals, more 
precisely:
7i =  Pn ^  72 =  P12
Pi P12+ P 11 P2 P1 2 +P22
Had we been in a framework of independently distributed information these
ratios would be the same because of the quasilinearity of the utility functions.
1.8.2 E x isten ce  o f  W alrasian E quilibrium  in th e  fic titiou s ex c h a n g e  
econom y.
Textbook microeconomics tells us that to prove with “standard” theorems the ex­
istence of a Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy where the agents have 
strongly monotone utility functions we need the aggregate excess demand correspon­
dence z (p), defined for all price vectors p 0 , to satisfy the following properties:
1. z (•) is upper hemi-continuous;
2 . z (•) is homogeneous of degree zero;
3. pz(p) = 0 for all p (Walras’ law);
4. There is an s > 0 such that zi{p) > —s for every commodity I and all p;
5. lim inf \\z (p)|| —> 00 . 
p —>d A
One can easily check that the first four conditions are satisfied in our framework. 
We have problems with the fifth property because of the assumption of compact 
choice sets (r% and cl belong to a compact set for 2 =  1,2). In our case excess demands
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for both goods do not tend to infinity when their price tends to the boundary of the 
simplex because the choice set is bounded.
This inconvenience can be solved by removing the assumption of compact choice 
set for one principal19. We have therefore obtained that the aggregate excess demand 
for a commodity will go to infinity if the price of that commodity is zero. This allows 
to apply standard existence theorems to our framework.
The removal of the assumption of compactness does not cause any further prob­
lem because the market clearing conditions (which are the constraints of the agent in 
the principal agent game) will hold and together with the compactness assumption 
for the other principal will ensure that the equilibrium allocation will belong to a 
compact set.
1.8 .3  IC 2 is not b in d in g at an  optim um .
The argument of this proof is very similar to the one adopted in the proof of Lemma 
1 in Maskin and Tirole [1990].
We need to show that IC constraint for type 2 agent is not binding at the optimum 
of program P*, in other words that a solution of such program satisfies IC2.
If fi'. is a solution to PI then:
^ ( M ) > ^ ( f 4 )  (*)
must hold because it if was violated then the polling allocation /x, defined so that 
for every i:
= ? 2  =  /4
that also satisfies the constraints of P* would generate higher values of the max-
19 In general equilibrium theory with incomplete markets this procedure is known as the “Cass- 
trick” .
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imand.
If fi] violates IC2 (that is type 2 strictly prefers fa  to fa), then define /£ so that 
fa = fa = fa± for all i. The allocation fa satisfies all the constraints of PI and, from 
(*), generates at least as high a value of the maximand as fa.. But, because the 
type 2 agent strictly prefers to fa2, we can slightly reduce the transfer from the 
principal to the agent in fa. without violating the constraints. But then j2[ generates 
a higher values of the maximand than a violation of fas  optimality.
Chapter 2
R isky A llocations from a 
R isk-N eutral Inform ed  
Principal.
2.1 Introduction
We are facing an informed principal problem when, in a principal agent relationship, 
the player that offers the contract possesses private information, and this is regardless 
of the agent having private information or not. When dealing with this kind of 
models the main question is to understand if the principal can gain from having 
private information and what is the optimal contract that had to be offered to the 
agent to maximise the principal surplus.
We study a model with a risk neutral informed principal who deals with a risk 
averse agent who has private information as well. We make the further assumptions 
that types are independently distributed and that the utility function of the agent 
does not depend from the type of the principal, the latter assumption implies that 
the model is one of private values. We show that the principal benefits from having
63
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private information in comparison to the payoff she would have received had her 
type been public. The optimal contract will involve a pooling offer that will leave 
the agent uninformed when he has to accept the contract.
The reason is that in models of private values signalling is not an issue, as 
Maskin and Tirole [1990] explain there is no competition among the different types 
of principal so no type of principal can loose from being pooled with another one1. 
In other words, concealing information has no costs because no type of principal can 
gain by separating herself from other types.
It can happen though that the principal is indifferent between revealing or not, 
that is there may not be benefits from hiding one’s type. It has been shown that there 
are two reasons why the principal may wish to conceal her information to her benefit. 
Maskin and Tirole [1990] show that a risk averse informed principal benefits from 
not revealing her type through the contract offer for risk sharing reasons. They also 
show that this gain disappears when the principal has a quasilinear utility function. 
In Chapter 1 that even when both players are risk neutral the principal obtains a 
higher payoff by not revealing her type if there is correlation between the type of 
the agent and the one of the principal. Whether it is a different attitude towards 
risk, or a different belief about the probability of one particular type of agent, what 
happens in both models is that different types of principal have different relative 
costs of satisfying the agent’s constraints2. If the principal makes a not-revealing 
contract offer then the agent remains uninformed and his constraints need to hold 
only at an interim stage and this gives more freedom to the principal. What will 
happen is that each type of principal will be able to relax the relatively more costly 
constraint while tightening the other. In this equilibrium ex-post constraints may
^ e e  Maskin and Tirole [1992] for an analysis of common values model where sginalling causes 
more problems when looking for the optimal contract.
2 These two circumstances can be both viewed as Hirshleifer effects (Hirshleifer [1971]). It has 
been shown in fact that early disclosure of information can destroy advantageous trading opportu­
nities, which are present because agents have different attitudes towards the same risky event or 
because they have different beliefs about the probability of an event happening.
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not be satisfied in every state of the world.
In this work we show that even when types are independent and the principal is 
risk neutral there are still benefits for the principal from concealing her information 
if the agent is risk averse.
Risk aversion on the part of the agent causes the relative costs of satisfying 
his incentive and participation constraints different for the two types of principal 
allowing the principal to make some profit from tightening and relaxing the ex-post 
constraints as long as the interim ones are satisfied.
The optimal contract results in a more risky final allocation, where the ex-post 
payoffs for the agent are more extreme than in the case where the type of the 
principal is public. The agent knows, when accepting the contract, that the spread 
of his ex-post utility will be bigger and being risk averse he will have to be paid 
some risk premium. Still, it is in the interest of the principal to do so meaning that 
the advantage of allowing each type of principal to relax the relatively more costly 
constraint is large enough to compensate for the higher expected payments that the 
principal is granting to the agent as risk premium.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model. Section
2.3 analyses the contract when the type of the principal is known, which we use as 
benchmark. Section 2.4 studies the optimal contract when the principal is privately 
informed. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The model.
2.2 .1  O b jective  fu n ction s and inform ation.
There are two players, one principal and one agent and both have a type-dependent 
utility function. Each agent has private information about his or her type but their 
utility function does not directly depend on the other player’s type. This assumption
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sets our model in what the literature calls a private values framework. We are going 
to denote the type of the principal and the one of the agent with two parameters i 
and j  (with i = 1 ,2  and j  = 1, 2)3 respectively.
The principal is risk neutral with respect to transfers and her utility function 
takes the following quasi-linear form:
V i = S i ( y ) - t ,
where y is an observable and verifiable action, t is a monetary transfer from the 
principal to the agent. S % (•) is continuous, increasing and concave in y  for every i.
The agent is risk averse and his utility function has the following functional form:
Uj =  U { t - 9 j y ),
where U  (•) is continuous, increasing and concave in y and, to simplify, inde­
pendent from j .  We assume that U j  is decreasing in j , implying therefore that: 
Q\ < 02-
The agent’s reservation utility is normalised to zero.
To guarantee the existence of equilibrium, we assume that the feasible actions 
and transfers lie in compact and convex sets.
We assume that the parameters i and j  are drawn from independent common 
knowledge distributions. The parameters indicate the type of each player, i is known 
only to the principal and j  to the agent. The prior beliefs of the agent on the type i of 
the principal are denoted by type i can assume value 1 (resp. 2) with probability 
</>1(resp.^2) such that 0 i + 0 2 — 1- We denote by pj the beliefs of the principal on the 
possible values of 0; 0j — 0\ and 0 2  with probabilities p\ and p2 (with Pi +P2 =  1)-
3 As in Maskin and Tirole [1990, 1992] the limitation on the possible types for the players is not 
essential but simplifies the analysis and favors the intuition of the results.
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2 .2 .2  T h e princip al-agent gam e.
The timing of the principal-agent game is as follows:
1. The principal proposes a mechanism in the feasible set M  to the agent. A 
mechanism m  in M  will specify i) a set of possible messages for each party and 
ii) for each pair of messages chosen simultaneously an allocation (y, t). Note 
that the set M  includes the set of direct revelation mechanisms in which parties 
simultaneously announce their types, by invoking the revelation principle for 
Bayesian game we can restrict the attention to direct truthful mechanisms.4
2. The agent updates his prior (if he has learned something from the offer), 
accepts or refuses the contract offered. If he refuses both players get zero 
utility and the game ends. If the agent accepts then parties move to the last 
stage of the game.
3. Both parties announce their types and the proposed mechanism is imple­
mented.
We will study the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the overall game.
2.3 Benchmark: th e full information allocation.
As a benchmark we study the equilibrium when the principal’s information is com­
mon knowledge. Maskin and Tirole call it the full information case (even if the 
principal does not know the agent’s type) and it is nothing more than the standard 
screening model.
We know from the revelation principle that every equilibrium allocation of this 
game can be obtained as an equilibrium of a direct truthful mechanism. The
4In this framework (as in Maskin and Tirole [1990]) the principle states that for any mechanism 
and for given beliefs any equilibrium of the mechanism is equivalent to  an equilibrium of a direct 
revelation mechanism in which types are truthfully announced.
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outcome that will be implemented in equilibrium will have to satisfy two
types of constraints individual rationality and incentive compatibility.
For every i the participation constraints are: U (tj — OjVj^ J >  0 for j  =  1,2. 
While the truthtelling constraints are: U (t^ — Ojy^J > U ( tlk — 9jyk) for all j,k .
Standard arguments apply, and in this context only two constraints are binding, 
the participation constraint of type 2 and the incentive compatibility of type 1.
Therefore in the case of full information a principal of type i proposes a contract 
{(y \it\ ) » 2^)} th at solves the following program:
such thatmax f^ P j (&  (yj)  -*;■)
1 v v '  '
( ^ )  =  j  IR ' e2y'2) = 0
1 c?:u (t\ -  eiy\) = v  (4 -  eiy\)
V)
(V),
where p1 and 7 * are the Lagrange multipliers for the IR and IC constraints. 
Given the specific functional forms chosen for the utility functions of the two 
players we can actually find the precise solution to this problem.
A principal of type i will offer the following decreasing schedule of output and 
the respective transfers, { (y \ ,t \)  , (2/2 ^ 2 ) }:
type 1 : S 1' (y\) =  0i and t\ = 9iy\ +  A9y\
type 2 : S" (y\) = 9 2 + — M  and t\  =  92yl2-
P2
As one could expect, the solution preserves standard characteristics like the “no 
distortion at the top” property and no informational rent for the “low-type” agent. 
It preserves also the feature that the risk aversion on the part of the agent does 
not influence the solution In particular, the downward distortion in the production
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requested to a type 2 agent is the same that one would observe if the agent was risk 
neutral.
For future reference denote by the solution to the full information
program (Fl). Let v1 = JZjPjV1 ( v j^ j )  the type i principal’s payoff.
At this stage it is essential to look at the ratio of the Lagrange multipliers of the 
full information optimisation problem; they are different across types of principal 
and have the following expression:
p‘ U ' ( t \ - e iy \) U '(M y \)
7* P iU '( t i - $ 2yi) p iU'(0) '
This implies that the relative cost of fulfilling the individual rationality and 
incentive compatibility constraint is different for each type of principal5.
As Maskin and Tirole [1990] have shown, as long as the relative costs of the 
incentive and participation constraints is not the same for both types of principal 
there are some gains coming from the fact one type of principal can relax the con­
straint that is relatively more costly for her, while enforcing the one that is relatively 
less costly. This result can be achieved only if the constraints of the agent can be 
satisfied at an interim stage (and not ex-post as in the full information case) and 
they need to hold only on average exactly when the agent does not know the type 
of the principal, in other words when the offer is not revealing.
2.4 The pooling offer.
As anticipated in the previous section we now return to the case in which the type of 
the principal is not known to the agent, and we are going to show that not revealing 
her type to the agent until the third stage of the game will allow any type of principal 
to obtain a payoff higher than the full-information one.
5 The ratio of the Lagrange multipliers would be the same for the two types of principal if also 
the agent was risk neutral (see Maskin and Tirole [1990].
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First of all it is important to bear in mind that the full information allocation 
can still be implemented when the type of the principal is not known to the agent. 
This is true because we are in the private values framework, as Maskin and Tirole 
[1990] explain, there is no rivalry between different types of principal and therefore 
revealing the type through the contract offer at the first stage is incentive compatible 
for the principal.
An informed principal has the alternative choice of not revealing her type, and 
we are going to show that indeed the full-information allocation can never be an 
equilibrium when the type of the principal is private information to her.
First of all we show that it is dominated and then we characterise the new 
equilibrium.
P ro position  2.1 The full information allocation dominated from the
point of view of every type of principal i — 1 ,2  by the allocation , which is
the solution to the following program:
(fi) =
max pj ( s i (y^\ — tlj \  such that
I R :  U ( t \ - 9 2y\) = - r i 
I C : U  (t\ -  eiy{) -  u  (4 -  eiy\) =  - c \
Proof. It is evident that the only difference from the full-information program is 
that now there is some slack allowed on each constraint.
Let v\ be the maximised value of the maximand, by definition of the shadow
prices 'p1 and it approximately equals v1 + ~j?rl -I-7 V  for small values of rx and c \
Let p i be a solution to F*.
Choose negative slack variables ( r ^ c 1) for the type 1 principal; then the slack 
variables for type 2 are defined as: r 2 =  — ^ r 1 and c2 =  — ^ c 1. We can then write: 
v\ — F1 — ~plr l +  7  V
v2 — v2 ~  ^  (jjfir1 +  7 V ) .
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Both the above left hand sides can be positive for (r1, c1) if and only if I* ^  1^, 
as it is in our case. ■
We have therefore shown that when the each type of principal is allowed some 
slackness on the agent’s constraints then they can achieve a higher payoff than in 
the full information case.
The principal, whatever her type, will offer the same contract which will consist 
of a menu of four allocations, one for each possible state of the world. If she does 
so then the agent will not be able to infer anything about her type and accept 
the contract still on the basis of the prior probability distribution. W hat really 
happens is that the principal offers a contract that contains allocations that will 
never be implemented (e.g. a typel-lprincipal offers also those that are designed for 
a type-2 principal), but she does so because this will keep the agent ignorant about 
her type. This means that agent’s constraints, individual rationality and incentive 
compatibility, will have to hold only in expectation leaving the principal the freedom 
of not satisfying some of the ex-post ones. We have already shown that each type 
of principal gains from being able to not satisfy the constraint that is relatively 
more expensive for her, in what follows we are going to characterise the equilibrium 
contract.
In a pooling offer each type of principal will offer a contract (y\ , t) ) such
V J / ij=l,2
that it is a solution, for i = 1, 2 , of:
CHAPTER 2. R ISK Y ALLOCATIONS AND RISK-NEUTRAL INF. PRINC. 72
A solution to this problem is then incentive compatible for the principal and the 
agent and will be accepted by both types of agent.6
We can now state the following result, which characterises the equilibrium of the 
principal-agent game.
Proposition 2.2 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the principal agent game any
type of principal will offer the same contract m  — (?/*•,£*•) . The agent’s beliefs
'  'i,j= 1,2
are unchanged and accepts the contract. A t the last stage both parties announce their
type truthfully and the contract is implemented.
Contract rh — ( j/*-, t\ } that satisfies the following conditions for i — 1,2;
\  J J  *,.7= 1,2
1. S* (yf) = e1 
I. S* ( „ ! ) . « ,  +
s. i : < t > i U ( t i - e 2y i ) = o
i=1
4■ E <t>i [ U (tj - 0iyi) - u { t \ - e xy\ ) \  =  0
i=1
u ( t \ - e iy\ ) - u ( t i - e iy'2) P l u ' { ( t \ - e iy\)) u ' { ( t j - e  iy'2))
u { t \ - e 2yi) P2U’ ( ( t i - e 2y'2)) u ’ ( { t \ - e 2y$ y
Proof. First note that any contract m  which is a solution to problem (Pl) is 
incentive compatible for the principal and agent and is individually rational for the 
agent. We need therefore to show that m  is indeed a solution to (P 2).
To begin with, note that rh is a solution to the less constrained problem (P*) 
which is defined as:
6 Standard considerations ensure the satisfaction of the participation constraint of a type 1 agent 
and of the incentive compatibility constraints of a type 2  agent.
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max £  Pj ( s i (y{] — f t )  such that
1 R 2 ■ E  W  ( 4  -  % 2 ) =  0
2=1




Program (P*) is the same as (P l) except that the incentive compatibility con­
straints for the two types of principal have been omitted.
The first order conditions for this problem are:
J |  =  P i? ' (y i) +  01?01 U' ( fi -  eiy\) =  0
J |  =n£? (yj) -  h p 'W  (4 -  e2y\) + 4,tfexu' (4 -  eiy\) = o
f £  =  ~Pi -  4>i'fU' {t\ -  8 iv \)  =  o
= -P2 + <t>x? v  (4 -  92y\) -  4>XW  (4 -  exy\) = o
B L  2—■ = Y.4>iV (4 -  o*A) = o
OP 2=1
f ) L  2™ = E  *  [c/ («i -  6 i y \ )  -  u (4  -  01^ ) ]  = o
From (jhjr'j and we obtain the first condition which implicitly defines y\,
while from and ( f j r )  we get the definition of y^- Then (j~ f) and
give the agent’s constrains (IR and IC). So rh satisfies the first order conditions of 
problem (P*).
Now m is also a solution to (P l) if it is incentive compatible for both types
of principal. To show this first note that each principal maximises her expected
utility over the same set of constraints. Therefore the value at the optimum of the
utility function cannot be higher if the principal then lies and chooses the optimal
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allocation chosen by the other type. More precisely, call h > 0 the set of
constraints of problem (P*) and let be the allocation that maximises
Pj ( s 1 ~ tf )  over ^ 0 and {y2j i ^ j  the equivalent for a type 2
principal. It is evident that the following holds:
£  Pj (S1 (Vj) “ * } ) > £  Pj ( S1 (Vj) ~  * j ) ,
j =l j=l
that is: each principal prefers her optimal allocations to the ones of the other 
type. If the other’s one were preferred, they would have been chosen in the first 
place because the set of constraints is the same.
So m  is incentive compatible for both types of principal and is therefore a solution 
to (Pi).
Finally, note that the ratio of the Lagrange multipliers is:
f  P i U ' ( ( t \ - 8 i y \ ) )  
f  P2 U ' { ( t \ - e 2y\ ))  U ' ( { t \ - e 2y \ ) y
This can be used to rewrite condition 5 as:
P V + 7 V  =  0 7
where r% =  - U  (f2 -  #22/2 ) and cl = - [ U  (t\ -  9iy\) - U ( t l2 -  Oiy2)] .
In addition from the agent’s constrains we know that: r 2 =  — ^ r 1 and c2 
^c1, which together with the above implies that also the following must hold:
p k r l  rykcl —  q ? -with k 7  ^ i.
Since in general, rl and cl are different from zero, this implies that in equilibrium:
7This ensures that ’’the value” of the slackness (positive and negative) for each type of principal is 
the same. Morevoer it is equal to zero, the value of the slackness of the full-information acquisition.
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The above means that at the equilibrium the relative cost of satisfying the con­
straints is the same for the two types of principal, there are therefore no more gains 
to be obtained from relaxing further some constraints.
It remains to show that no type of principal can gain by deviating by offering 
a contract different from m. This can be done by choosing the appropriate off- 
equilibrium path beliefs, that are arbitrary. As Maskin and Tirole [1990] argue 
these belief need to be chosen in such a way that if the principal proposes another 
mechanism all types of principal are no better off than with m. Suppose that a 
mechanism m  is offered, and suppose that the agent has out of equilibrium beliefs 
such that =  1 , 0 2  =  0^, the a type 1 principal will receive at most the full 
information payoff v1. Similarly if beliefs are =  1,02 == o) then type 2 will at 
most obtain v2. From continuity and because m  is strongly Pareto optimal for the 
prior beliefs, then there exist intermediate beliefs for which both types do not whish 
to deviate and offer m. ■
We have therefore characterised the allocation that a risk neutral informed prin­
cipal, regardless of her type, will offer to a risk averse agent. The main feature of 
this allocation is that it does not satisfy all the agent’s ex-post constraints, but only 
the interim ones. As a consequence the risk aversion of the agent plays a role in 
determining the optimal downward distortion in the quantity of a low-type agent. 
Efficiency for the high-type is preserved. Finally, in equilibrium, the ratios of the 
lagrange multipliers of the two types of principal are the same. This implies that no 
more gains can be reaped by tightening and relaxing the constraints.
To understand more clearly what goes on in the equilibrium we need to specify 
which principal gains from relaxing which constraint. Let’s assume that S 1 (•) > 
S 2 (•) for every y (and that S lf (•) > S 2' (•)). This enables us to say that the full
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information quantities can be ordered as follows:
y\ >  y \ and y \ > y\.
Which in turn tells us that the informational rent enjoyed by an efficient agent 
is greater when the principal is of type 1 (the informational rent is A&y^i f°r every 
i). This means that when the type of principal is not known if he offers the full 
information contract to the agent then the expected payoff of the two types of agent 
would be agent would be:
faU  (A9y\) +  (j>2U (A9yl) j for a type 1 agent,
and
0 1 U (0 ) -{-faU (0 ) , for a type 2  agent.
As we have shown above the full-information allocation is not optimal for the 
principal. In particular:
U> (A 9y\) pi p* _ U' (A ey\)
PiC/'(0) 7 1 7 2 piU '(0) ’
meaning that a type 1 principal finds relatively more costly to satisfy the indi­
vidual rationality constraint than the type 2. In the pooling offer type 1 principal 
is going to relax the individual rationality constraint, i.e.:
U (t\ -  e2y\) <  0 ,
but because the constraints have to hold in expectation the former inequality 
implies the following:
v  (t\ -  e2yl) > 0.
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On the other side a type 2 principal will relax the incentive compatibility con­
straint:
u ( t \ - e iyl) < u ( t 2 - e iyl ) ,
which implies that for a type 1 principal the following must hold:
u { t\-e 1y\)< u{t\-e1y\).
This constraints relaxing and tightening have, obviously, an effect on the mar­
ginal utility of the agent and the term which defines the downward distortion of an 
inefficient agent will be different for each type of principal. In particular:
U ' m - 9 i y l ) )  , V  m  - >,
while in the full information allocation they were both equal to 1. As a conse­
quence y\ is now less distorted that in the full information allocation {y\ > f/^and 
y\ is more distorted (y% <  2/2)5 therefore widening the gap between the quantities 
produced under the two types of principal.
This has a direct effect on the expected payoff of both types of agent that are 
now facing more risk, for a type one agent (the efficient type) the difference in 
informational rent has become larger:
AQy\ -  M y l  > A6y\ -  A&yl, 
increasing therefore the riskiness of the ex-ante expected rent/payoff:
^U {M y\)+ < l> 2U {/\6 y l) .
While a type 2 agent, who in the full information allocation does not face any
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ex-ante risk (getting his reservation utility with any type of principal), will get a 
positive rent in one state of the world and negative in the other:
— ^22/2) — ^22/2) '
+
What is surprising about this result then is that a risk neutral principal prefers 
to implement an allocation that is more risky to for the agent, if compared to the 
full information allocation, instead of eliminating any risk. The agent must of course 
be given a risk premium if he has to accept a more risky contract, still the principal, 
whatever her type, gains from the new pooling offer. This means that the benefit of 
relaxing the relatively more expensive constraint gives an expected benefit which is 
higher then the risk premium that needs to be paid to the agent.
2.5 Concluding remarks.
We have shown that in a model with a risk neutral informed principal and a risk 
averse agent the principal gains by making a not revealing contract offer that will 
keep the agent uninformed about her type until the implementation stage.
The optimal contract will result in an equilibrium allocation that involves a larger 
spread in the ex-post payoffs of the agent, forcing him to take up more risk when he 
accepts the contract.
We believe this highlights how interesting is to study principal agent relationships 
with an informed principal because some of the usual features the one sided standard 
screening models disappear. A risk neutral principal does not reduce any longer the 
risk that a risk averse agent has to face and the risk aversion of the agent plays a 
role on the solution of the trade-off between rents and incentives that defines the 
downward distortions in the physical production.
Part II
Collusion and D elegation
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Chapter 3
M onitoring o f D elegated  
Contracting.
3.1 Introduction.
In any organisational structure, the nature of communication can be 
important to the efficiency of the transactions governed by that form.
(O. Williamson [1975]).
Delegation of economic activity and subcontracting are widely observed phenom­
ena. The need of exploiting the gains from specialisation is one of the reasons for 
their diffusion, which has been favored by the high improvement of communication 
systems and by the increased sophistication of the available forms of contracts.
What is often observed are hierarchical structures, where each level is linked to 
the lower one by a contract ruling one or more economic activities. Hierarchical 
decentralisation involves therefore gains from specialisation, but brings also extra­
costs due to the loss of control over lower levels of these hierarchies. The head of 
the hierarchy can then try to reduce these costs by regaining some control over the 
“subordinates”: one way to do so is monitoring these delegated relationships to
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acquire information.
While most of the incentive theory literature has taken information constraints 
as given, we make an attempt towards endogenising the informational structure. 
We see how incentives are affected by the strategic interaction of the members of a 
hierarchy when the principal can monitor the lower levels.
We study the contracting over a production process in a very simple delegated 
environment. More precisely, we look at a three-tier hierarchy where a principal 
wants a final good which is produced by an agent (Ai) using an intermediate good 
provided by another agent (A 2 ). Both agents have private information about their 
marginal costs of production, this sets us in an adverse selection world.
We assume that the principal contracts over the quantity desired of final good 
directly with A \ and lets him free to contract with A 2 about the provision of the 
intermediate good, i.e. the principal cannot contract directly with the second agent. 
Two contracts will have to be studied, a grand-contract between the principal and 
the first agent and a sub-contract between the two agents. Given that hierarchies and 
delegation are widely observed phenomena, we study some features of the agents’ 
strategic behavior in this specific environment. We therefore impose a delegated 
structure to our model, without asking what axe the reasons that lead to such an 
organisational mode or comparing it with a centralised one.
Delegation reduces the burden of communication and information processing on 
the principal, but on the other hand it also introduces additional incentives problems. 
These come from the fact that, even if the principal contracts directly only with one 
agent, she would like to condition the menu of contracts also on the type of the 
second agent. Therefore, when offering the contract to A \ the principal has to give 
incentives to this agent to truthfully report not only his own type, but also the type 
of the second one, which he will have learned at the sub-contracting stage. In other 
words, the cost of delegation comes from the fact that the informational rents paid
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to the agent with whom the principal deals directly can be quite high; this happens 
because the principal has to reimburse A\ for the informational rent he has paid 
to A 2 (after all, these are costs for A\) and then give him incentives to truthfully 
report two pieces of information.
It would then seem that monitoring at no cost the communication between the 
two agents would be profitable for the principal because she would get to know at 
no cost a piece of information for which she would have to pay otherwise. The direct 
effect coming from this activity is indeed a gain for the principal, due to a reduction 
in the transfer she makes to the first agent. But to evaluate thoroughly the effect 
of monitoring on the profits of the principal we need to study the possibility of 
profitable deviations of the first agent who is the one loosing the most from this 
activity.
We consider two monitoring possibilities: in the first case the principal observes 
the report that the second agent makes to the first one; in the second framework the 
principal observes the menu of subcontracts offered by the first agent to the second 
one.
When the principal monitors the report from A 2 to A \ she becomes informed 
about the type of the second agent, but it is the first agent who is made worse off 
by the monitoring activity even if he still earns a positive rent in some states of the 
world. The agent can then try to nullify the effect of this monitoring by eliminating 
the communication with the other agent. A way to do so is to offer a “pooling” 
contract that does not require any report from A 2 . The possibility of this reaction 
introduces a new constraint for the principal: she has to give the right incentives 
to the agent to screen properly the types of the second one. This new constraint 
introduces some elements of moral hazard and puts back in the framework some 
inefficiencies that had disappeared with the monitoring, so that the gain for the 
principal from monitoring is greatly reduced or disappears completely.
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When the principal monitors the sub-contract offer she may get to know the type 
of the first agent who is then left with no informational rent whatsoever. The first 
agent, when dealing with the agent at the bottom of the hierarchy, is an “informed 
principal”,1 since his marginal cost of production is private information to him. 
Previous results in the literature show that A\ is indifferent between revealing or 
not his type to A 2 , but the monitoring activity of the principal makes him prefer a 
not-revealing contract offer.
In other words, as an attempt to neutralise the monitoring activity, A \ can try to 
delay the revelation of his own type by offering a menu of two pairs of contracts, each 
pair designed for one of the possible types of A 2 (but that pools across the types 
of the first agent, leaving for the moment the second agent uninformed). Then, 
before production takes place, he will reveal his type and it will be clear which 
contract, inside the chosen menu, is going to be implemented. The principal then 
obtains no information and she does not gain from monitoring the first agent’s offer 
of sub-contract.
This work is in the stream of literature on collusion and delegation in hierar­
chies which started with Tirole [1986]2, who gave a clear cut to the way in which 
organisations and hierarchies were studied in economic theory. They were no longer 
considered single blocks but networks of overlapping and nested principal-agent re­
lationships where coalition formation and side-contracting are allowed. Since then 
many articles have been published on this topic, trying to model the additional 
incentive problems that delegation and collusion can cause even in very simple hi­
erarchies.
More precisely, the set-up of our model is taken from Laffont and Martimort 
[1998] where they compare decentralised and centralised organisation of a production 
process when there are limits on communication.
1 See Maskin and Tirole [1990] for a clear definition of the informed principal problem.
2 On collusion in hierarchies see also Tirole [1992] and Laffont and Martimort [1997, 2000].
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An analysis very similar to ours is carried out in Baron and Besanko [1992], but 
they do not consider both monitoring activities and do not model the possibility of 
reaction by the agents. In fact what we do is trying to endogenise the informational 
structure in a hierarchy. Another work in this direction is Dequiedt and Martimort 
[2002], they study a hierarchy where the middle agent can choose whether to learn 
the information of the bottom agent through fixed cost monitoring or via arm’s 
length contracting. The choice affects the overall costs of information acquisition 
and the distribution of rents in the hierarchy. They then study how the optimal 
contract, designed by the principal, changes with the cost of monitoring. They also 
have some moral hazard in the model because the preferences over the information 
acquisition methods of the principal and the agent may not be aligned.
Also very related to this, the work by Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein 
[1995] compares centralised and decentralised structures with similar timing, but 
agents do not supply strictly complementary inputs as in our setting. Other related 
works are Felli [1996] and Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort [2002] but in their 
settings the first agent is unproductive and plays only a supervisory role.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model, utility 
functions and contracts. Section 3.3 derives the optimal delegation proof contract 
in the benchmark case. Section 3.4 studies the same organisational structure but 
allows for the monitoring of the report into the sub-contract. Section 3.5 allows 
instead for the monitoring of the contract offered. Section 3.6 concludes. All proofs 
are in the appendix (section 3.7).
3.2 The M odel
The principal P  wants to buy a quantity q of final good. The first agent A \  produces 
a quantity q\oi the final good using the intermediate good <72 which is produced by 
the second agent A 2 . Production uses a Leontieff technology such that q — q\ = <7 2 ,
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in other words the production process is “componetised” .3 As we said before, the 
organisational structure is decentralised, so the principal contracts directly only with 
the first agent, leaving him the freedom of contracting with the second one.
Each agent Ai {i =  1,2) faces a constant marginal cost 6i of producing good i. 
These marginal costs are independently drawn from the same common knowledge 
distribution with discrete support ©i =  0  =  {£,0}, and A0 — 0 — 6 > 0. With 
probability v  the agent is efficient, i.e. 0* =  9. With probability (1 — v) the agent is 
inefficient, i.e. 9i = 0.
Each agent knows only its own cost and not that of the other agent. The principal 
is uninformed on both agents’ costs.
The principal maximises her revenue minus the monetary transfers to the first 
agent:
W  = S ( q ) - t
with S' (•) > 0, S" (■) < 0.
The first agent’s utility is given by the monetary transfer received by the principal 
minus the total costs:
U1 = t - 6 i q -  y2
where y2 is the transfer he makes to the second agent at the subcontracting 
stage.
The second agent’s utility is given by:
U2 = y2 -  02 q
If we had a centralised structure (where the principal directly contracts with
3 As in Baron and Besanko [1992] we use the word c o m p o n e t i s e d  in the sense that the good is 
formed by putting together components in fixed proportions. The components are produced by 
different firms or organizational units. As an example we can think of a producer of electricity and 
a distributor of electricity.
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each agent4) we would have obtained the following second best quantities and rents:
•  S ' ( q  ( 0 , 0 ) )  =  2 0
•  s1 ( q (£5)) =  S '  {q ( 0 , 0 ) )  =  S ’ (q) =  0  +  0  +  j ^ A 6  
.  s'(q(e,e)) = 2 5 + & A e
• ul (5,0i) = u2(0i,e) = o
•  U i  ( 0 , 0 i )  =  U 2  ( 0 i , 0 )  =  A 0  ( y q  +  ( 1  - u ) q  ( 0 , 1 ) )
The agents are therefore treated symmetrically by the principal and obtain a 
positive informational rent only when they are efficient.
3.2 .1  T h e contracts
As we mentioned in the previous section the organisation of the productive activity 
is decentralised, the principal contracts with A\ and then the latter contracts with 
A 2 . Therefore we will have to study two contracts, which will be offered by the 
parties at different stages.
The principal proposes a grand contract, GC , to the first agent that specifies a 
quantity to be produced and a transfer, i.e. a pair where
0 i  and 0 2  are the reported types5. This contract takes therefore a form which is 
standard in the adverse selection literature, the menu offered by the principal to the 
first agent is composed by four pairs, a quantity and a transfer, one for each possible 
state of the world. Which pair will actually be implemented depends on the report 
of A \ about both agents’ types.
4 Laffont and Martimort [1997] show that this outcome is also collusion proof.
5 The Revelation Principle applies in this framework so we focuse only on direct mechanims, both 
for the grand contract and for the sub-contract.
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At a later stage, A \, who is the one allowed to communicate with A 2 , offers a 
side contract, 5(7, to the second agent that consists of a manipulation-function6 of 
reports and a transfer, i.e. |<l> ( 0 i , 0 2 ^ , 2/2 }? where 0 2  is the report from A2 to A \. 
This sub-contract is then an agreement between the two agents on how A \ shall 
report the information to the principal and how much A 2 receives for each of the 
possible reports. Therefore while the schedule for q is decided by the contracting 
between P  and A\, how much will be produced is determined at the subcontracting 
stage when the two agents fix the manipulation function given their true types. The 
manipulation function acts therefore as a commitment device for the first agent: 
if it was not part of the sub-contract then A \ could have incentive to renege the 
agreement reached with A 2 over the reports to be made to the principal.7
Throughout the paper we assume that sub-contracting is not contractible, that 
is the contract between the principal and the first agent cannot specify a particular 
sub-contract between the two agents.
In order to simplify notation, denote t(0 ,0 ) =  t; =  t\\ t(0,(fy = £2 ;
t (&t@) =  t  and use a similar notation for q (•).
3.2 .2  T h e tim ing.
The timing of the game is the following:
1. Nature draws 6 i each agent learns his cost.
2. P  proposes the grand contract M  to A\.
3. A\ offers SC  to A 2 .
6 This is a function that to any true pair of types assigns a pair of messages to be delivered to the 
principal $  : © 2 —* M i  x  M 2 (we do not allow random messages). Then because of the Revelation 
Principle the relevant range for $  (# i,# 2 ) will be ©2.
7 In that case the analysis would be much more complicate, various additional incentive con­
straints should be considered. Unless, of course, the report to be made is included in the sub­
contract in another way.
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4. A 2 accepts or refuses the other agent’s offer, if he refuses the game ends and 
both agents get their reservation utility.
5. A 2 reports to A\.
6 . A\ accepts or refuses M, if he refuses the game ends.
7. A\ reports to P  according to the manipulation function <E> #2^ •
8 . Output and monetary transfers are implemented, t  to A \ according to M . 2/2 
to A 2 according to SC.
With this timing then the first agent accepts the grand contract only at the very 
end and more important after getting to know the type of the second agent. This 
means that individual rationality constraints will have to be satisfied ex-post for 
A\. Another possibility would have been to consider interim individual rationality 
constraints for Ai, this means that the first agent accepts the grand contract when
he still does not know A.2 ’s type. This variation would amount to inserting stage
6  in our timing between stages 2 and 3. The principal is better off when she has 
to satisfy these constraints only in expected terms because she can “play” with the 
slackness of the constraints in different states of the world and since the agent is risk 
neutral this does not bring any extra-cost. Actually the second-best can be achieved 
in this case and delegation has no cost since it implements the same equilibrium 
as under centralisation. This is because at the time of accepting the contract the 
principal and A \ are in the same situation vis-a-vis A 2 , none of them knows his type 
and this is enough to enable the principal to align the interest of the first agent to 
his own8. In our setting instead, at the moment he has to accept the grand contract, 
A\ has an advantage over the principal vis-a-vis A 2 . He has two pieces of private
8This is a well established result (see for example Laffont and Martimort [1998]). Laffont and 
Martimort [1997] obtain the same result in a centralized framework with collusion under asymmetric 
information with non-anonymous transfers. There the two agents enter into the side contract offered 
by an third party without knowing more on each other than the principal does.
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information and this will cause the even larger distortions in output compared to 
the second-best.
Therefore by choosing this particular timing we set ourselves in a framework 
where delegation is truly costly.9
3.3 D elegation w ithout m onitoring (benchmark).
In this section we study what can be considered the benchmark case for our analysis, 
a simple delegation model with no monitoring. 10
3.3 .1  T h e side con tract.
The overall game has two stages so we can solve it backwards starting at the sub­
contract stage. When agent being of type #i, offers the sub-contract to the 
bottom agent he maximises his expected utility with respect to a manipulation 
function and a transfer to the other agent. Since contracting takes place under 
asymmetric information A \ has to ensure that A^ participates and truthfully reveals 
his type, so standard constraints have to be considered when solving the following 
problem, SC(Q i)n :
9 Alternatively one could assume risk aversion for the first agent as in Faure-Grimaud, Laffont 
and Martimort [2002] and Faure-Grimaud and Martimort [2001].
10 The analysis of this section follows an extension of Laffont and Martimort [1998].
11 Since the first agent has private infromation but act as a principal when contracting with 
the bottom agent we are in an informed principal framework. As Maskin and Tirole [1990] have 
shown when utility function are quasilinear the principal cannot gain from concealing her private 
information. Therefore A \  does not loose from making a revealing offer.
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S C {9 i)=  <
max Ee2 [E/i (0i)] =  v { t($  (0i,0)) - 3/2 (0i,0) - 0 i g ( $  (0i,£)))
1/2(01 , 0i)
+  (1 -  V) (i (0  (01,0)) -  3/2 (01,5) -  019 ($  (0 !,5 )))
s.t.
»2 (01, 0) - 0 9  ($ (01, 0)) = 0
3/2 (« i,0) - g ? (* (0 i,fi)) =  V2 (01,0) - 0 ?  ($  (01,0))
(3.1)
Where the two constraints are the participation constraint of an inefficient sec­
ond agent and the incentive compatibility constraint of an efficient one, the others 
are trivially satisfied if the schedule of outputs is monotonic. From the binding 
constraints above we can derive the transfers for the bottom agent:
3/2 (01,0) =  0 g ($  (01,0)) ( 3 . 2 )
3/2 ( 0 1 , £ )  =  0 9  ( « ( 0 1 , 0 ) )  +  A 0 9  ( $  ( 0 i , 0 ) )  ( 3 . 3 )
These transfers are conditional on the report to the principal and leave some rent 
to the efficient type and, by assumption, in our framework they cannot be observed 
by the principal otherwise she would be able to infer the cost parameter of the first 
agent.
3 .3 .2  T h e  G ra n d  C o n tra c t .
When offering the grand contract the principal faces some constraints caused by the 
asymmetry of information between him and the agents; she has to give incentives to 
the agent she is contracting with, namely A \, to truthfully report all the valuable 
information. Since we are in a delegated environment, the first agent has not only
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to report his own type, but also the second agent’s one. This means that the 
incentive compatibility constraints will be different with respect to those that have 
to be satisfied in a normal one agent-one principal adverse selection model. In other 
words, we apply the Delegation-Proofness Principle, that says that there is no loss 
of generality in restricting the analysis to the study of grand mechanisms which 
are unchanged through the process of delegation, i.e. such that the sub-contract is 
equal to the “null sub-contract” that is the one where it is optimal for the agents not 
to manipulate the reports and the manipulation function is the identity function12, 
($  (fli,?2)  =  (eu e2)) .
Lem m a 3.1 A grand contract, GC, is delegation proof if  the following incentive 
compatibility constraints are satisfied:
t (0,0) ~ 29q (0,0) > t (0i, 02) -  2 Oq (0i, 02) (3.4)
t ( S , e )  -  ( e  +  e ) q ( e , 9 ) > t ( e u e 2 ) - ( 6  +  e ) q ( e u e 2 ) (3.5)
«(0 , 0 ) -  (g  +  0  +  j-^ A < ? )g (g ,3 )  > t ( 0 i , 0 2) -  (& + V + j ^ M \ q ( 6 1 , 8 2 )
(3.6)
t  (0,0) -  ( 2 0  +  Y Z Z A 9 )  < l ( 9 , 6 ) > t  (0 1 , 02) -  ( 2 0  +  q  (0!,02) (3.7)
v ( 0 i , 0 2 ) e e x e .
The above constraints give the conditions that the transfers from the principal 
to the middle agent has to satisfy to have truthful report in the grand contract in 
each possible state of nature. The reports are going to be ex-post efficient only for
pairs that involve an efficient second agent, in the other two cases there is some
12 As is becoming common in the works on delegation we loosely borrow from the collusion lit­
erature and the concept of collusion proofness, for a definition see Tirole [1992]. In the collusion 
framework the null side-contract involves also no transfers between the agent, this of course cannot 
happen in delegation models where transfers are legitimate.
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inefficiency due to the asymmetric information at the sub-contract stage. In par­
ticular a coalition of the kind (0 , 0 ) is more efficient13 than a coalition of the kind 
(0,0) therefore the former has an incentive to mimic the latter. This difference is 
due to the fact that A \, when he is facing an inefficient second agent, has even more 
incentives to distort his report because of the informational rent he has to pay to an 
efficient one14. This obviously applies also to a coalition of two inefficient agents.
In solving the problem the principal can think of facing a single individual who 
can be of four different types in a decreasing (or increasing) efficiency order.
The problem the principal is facing is therefore:
max E 9 uo2 [W] =  v2 (S  (g) - 1) -1- v  ( 1  -  v) (S  (qi) -  ?i) +  (3.8)
+i/ ( 1  -  v) (S  (q2) -  t2) +  (1 -  v)2 (S  (q) -  t)
Subject to incentive compatibility constraints (3.4-3.7) and the following indi­
vidual rationality constraints:
t — 2 0 q H— NOqi > 0
t i - ( 0  +  0) q i  >  0
t2 - ( 0  + 0)q2 - A 0 q  > 0
t - 2 0 q > 0
These four participation constraints axe ex-post constraints because the first 
agent accepts or refuses the grand-contract after he has received the report by the 
second agent, so he knows exactly what is the state of the world. He has a double
13In other words, the virtual type of a coalition (0 , 0 ) is lower then the virtual type of a coalition 
(0 , 0 ); where the virtual type is the relevant type for the principal when she chooses production 
assignments and it is given by the actual type plus the informational rent.
14Remember that the informational rent for an efficient second agent is A 9 q  ( $  (0 i,0 ))  so dis­
torting upward the report will reduce the quantity prescribed for a pair (0 i , 0 ), but also cause a 
decrease of the informational rent paid in the other two possible situations (0 i , 0 ).
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informative advantage with respect to the principal.
The binding constraints are the first three upward IC  constraints15 and the 
individual rationality constraint of a pair of inefficient agents:
t  — 2 Oq =  £2 — 2£<?2
£2 — (6 +  0) ?2 =  £1 — (0 +  0) gi
t - 2 6 q  = 0
If we solve for the transfers and substitute them in the objective function we can 
then maximise with respect to the optimal quantities.
P roposition  3.1 The optimal delegation proof contract has the following properties: 
•  for v < v*
— It implements a decreasing schedule of outputs q > q2 > qi > q where the 
prescribed quantities are implicitly defined by:
* S' (q )=  29
* s ' i ^ ^  + O + j^ A O
* S ’ (q1) = 9 + 9 + f f $ A 9
* S 1 (q) = 29 +
— The informational rents granted to the agents are the following:
* Ux (9,9) = A 9 (ft -  §i) +  ^ A 9 q x  + 9q
* Ux (9,9) = A0q + j ^ A 9 ( q x - q )
* U1 (?,9) = T^ A 9 ( q 1 - q )
15The other constraints are satisfied if the quantity schedule is monotonic.
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* Ui (6 , 0 ) = 0
*  U 2 ( 6 , 6 )  =  A 6 q i
*  U 2  ( 6 , 6 )  =  A 0 q
*  U 2  ( 6 i , 6 )  =  0
•  for v >v*
— It implements a decreasing schedule of outputs with some bunching q  > 
<?2 >  Q — Qi = Q where the prescribed quantities are implicitly defined by:
*  S '  ( g )  =  2 0
*  S ' ( q 2 )  =  6  +  6  +  r f c A 0
*  S ' ( q )  =  2 6 + U ^ A 0
— The informational rents granted to the agents are the following:
*  U i  ( 6 , 6 )  =  A 0 q 2
*  U i ( 0 , I )  =  A 6 q
* Ui (6 , 6 ) = Ui (6 , 6 ) = 0
*  U 2  ( 6 , 6 )  =  U 2  ( 8 , 6 )  =  A 6 q
* U2 (0 i ,'S)=Q
These quantities are more distorted downwards than the second best ones; the 
amounts of informational rent is more than double and consequently the principal 
optimally trades off some productive efficiency. Comparing these quantities to the 
second best schedule reveals that the further distortions are in the quantities pre­
scribed to pairs where an inefficient second agent is present, this is due to the extra 
incentive that A \ must be given to truthfully report the pair of types after he has
paid the informational rent to A 2 . Hence there is a cost for the principal of not
being able to communicate directly with one agent. This is exactly what is meant
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by the cost of delegation, the first agent accepts the contract offered by the prin­
cipal only after he has learned the type of the second agent. He has therefore a 
double informational advantage with respect to the principal and he is given double 
informational rent plus a “reimbursement" for the rent he has paid to the second 
agent.
By comparing the informational rents instead, we can see that the bottom agent 
is treated as in the second best contract: he gets positive rents only when he is 
efficient. What is different is what happens to the equilibrium payoff of the first 
agent when 1/  < v*, in this sub-case he obtains a positive rent also when he is 
inefficient but he is paired with an efficient second agent, this is due to the ex-post 
acceptance of the grand contract that gives him a double informative advantage when 
deciding about participation in the grand contract. When v > v* the probability 
of facing an efficient agent increases therefore the principal gains by bunching the 
contracts which involve an inefficient second agent.
3.4 M onitoring the report.
We now suppose that the principal can costlessly and perfectly monitor the commu­
nication between the agents (the report that A 2 makes to Ai).The collusive behavior 
of Ai (misreporting two types) is not feasible anymore, and this impossibility is ex­
ogenously imposed, it does not stem from the optimizing behavior of the agents. 
What we now observe is a mismatch between the organisational and informational 
structures; the first agent still contracts with the second one but, when reporting 
to the principal, he cannot manipulate the information about the other because the 
principal knows it already. In other words we have delegation of production and of 
contracting but not informational delegation.
The sub-contracting between A \  and A 2 is not directly affected by this monitor­
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ing activity, and since the revelation principle is still valid16 we can restrict attention 
to the set of direct mechanisms, as we did in the previous section, without the fear 
of losing in generality. Hence the incentive compatible transfers between the two 
agents are still given by:
y2 (0 i , 0 ) = S ? ( $ ( M )  
y* (0i,S = Qa (* (01,®) + Aftj. ($ (eu I ) ) 17
W hat changes instead is the contracting between the principal and the first agent: 
when offering the grand contract P  has to give incentives to A \ to reveal only one 
piece of information, his own type, because he already knows the type of the second 
agent. Since the agent cannot misreport the other’s type, incentive compatibility 
needs to hold over two separate pairs of contracts, each pair pools across the types 
of the second agent.
Lemma 3.2 When the principal can monitor the report from A 2 to A \, a grand 
contract is incentive compatible i f  the following constraints are satisfied:
t — 26 q =  t2 — 26% (3.9)
t\  — ^ 6  -t- 6  + —— ~ A gi = t — -f- 6  +  —------A0^ q (3.10)
The above are the relevant incentive compatibility constraints, namely the ones 
of an efficient first agent paired respectively with an efficient and inefficient second
16 The intuition of why this is so goes as follows: any inference that A i  can make on the type of 
A 2 can be made also by the principal, hence allowing also indirect mechanisms does not change the 
results.
17 Now the side contract includes a trivial version of the manipulation function which is now 
$ ( 0 i , 0 2 ) =  in other words only the type of the first agent can be distorted via a non
truthful report.
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agent. Now only pairs which include an efficient first agent will be given incentives 
to report truthfully, exactly because the type of the agent is known to the principal.
These constraints are ex-post because when A \ reports to the principal they both 
already know ^ ’s type. The first agent knows it because the side-contracting stage, 
and the report it entails, precedes the moment he has to report to the principal. 
The principal in turn is allowed to listen to the truthful report that A 2 makes to 
A l
The principal must also ensure the participation of the first agent into the grand 
contract, therefore the following individual rationality constraints have to be satis­
fied:
t - 2 9 q  + -AOqi > 0
* i - ( 0  +  0)<Zi > 0
t2 -  (e + 6 )q 2 - A e q  > 0
t - 2 9 q  > 0
These are the usual participation constraints for A \ and in the benchmark case 
only one was binding. Instead now, that the principal monitors and gets to know 
the type of A 2 , an inefficient first agent will be left with his reservation utility 
irrespectively of the type of second agent he is matched with. Namely:
t2 - ( 9  + fy q 2 - A e q  = 0  (3.11)
t - 2 §q =  0  (3 .1 2 )
This is because the principal is extracting only one piece of information, she
knows the type of A 2 therefore she is not giving any extra rent to A \ to reveal that
the second agent is efficient.
We are now ready to characterise the contract offered.
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P ro p o sitio n  3.2 When the principal can costlessly and perfectly monitor the report 
of the second agent into the sub-contract the optimal grand contract has the following 
characteristics:
• It implements a decreasing schedule of output q > q > q (where q =  q\ =  %) 
implicitly defined by:
-  S' (q) =  29
-  S '®  =  (£ + 5 ) +  i ^ A 0
-  S'(q) = 29 + & A 9
•  The informational rents granted to the agents are the following:
-  Ui {S.,8) =  A 0q
-  Ui (l1,9) = * A 0 ? +  . ^ A 9q
-  y i ( 5 , 0 i ) = O
-  u 2 {9,9) = A9q
-  U2 (9,9) = A 9q
-  U2 (9i,9) = 0
In each state of the world the quantities produced are equal to those that would 
be produced in a centralised organisation, this means that if the principal is allowed 
to monitor the report made into the sub-contract the second best can be achieved.18 
The principal though, cannot do better than the second best even if she gets to know 
a piece of information because she receives this information when the second agent 
is reporting to the first one after he has been given the right rents and incentives 
to do so. These in turn are costs for A\ that the principal has to reimburse if she
18 Note in fact that q i  =  §2 , symmetry is back in the model because the principal can avoid paying 
the extra-rent so that the two pairs (#,#) and (0 ,£) can now be treated equally as in a centralized 
organization.
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wants to ensure the participation of A\ in the production process. In other words, 
in the organisation overall two pieces of information have to be extracted, one by 
A\ and one by the principal, exactly like in a centralised setting where both pieces 
are extracted by the principal.
With the monitoring what disappears is the extra-cost of delegation compared 
to centralisation, but nothing more: even if we do not have informational delegation 
anymore we still face two agents that have private information and this keeps us in a 
second best world. The expected rents that the principal has to pay are exactly the 
second best ones, what is different is their distribution: when the principal monitors, 
an efficient first agent gets more rent when paired with an inefficient second one and 
less when the other agent is efficient than in the centralised organisation.
If we compare the equilibrium payoffs of all the players we can see that the 
principal gains from the monitoring while the first agent is worse off, he receives 
lower informational rents in two states of the world. The agent at the bottom of 
the hierarchy, instead, is unaffected by the monitoring because he still receives the 
right incentives to reveal his type when he sub-contracts with the middle agent. It 
is only after the sub-contract has been offered and accepted that the principal gets 
to know his type.
3 .4 .1  C a n  th e  a g e n t p ro f ita b ly  d e v ia te ?
We have seen that monitoring is useful to the principal, when this possibility is 
available, in fact, she can achieve the second best. She reduces distortions and lowers 
the transfers with respect to the benchmark case. This improvement happens at the 
expenses of A \ who gets lower utility in two states of the world, the ones in which 
he is paired with an efficient second agent.
We argue that to be complete the analysis of this environment should consider 
the possibility of the agent to deviate to the monitoring activity carried over by the
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head of the hierarchy, we will then see whether any profitable deviation exists and 
if this affects the overall equilibrium of the game.
Since the principal gets an advantage when she listens to the communication 
between the two agents at the sub-contracting stage a possible reaction is to reduce 
or eliminate the communication that is monitored19. In other words A \ could offer 
a contract that does not require a report, that is independent from A ^s  type. We 
call this a pooling sub-contract, because it does not separate the types of A 2 . More 
precisely the first agent will offer a set of transfers to the second one as if he was 
always inefficient, namely:
U2 (0 1 , 0 2 ) =  0 q ($ (0 1 , 0 2 ))
By paying always the high marginal cost of production he ensures that both types 
of A 2 are willing to participate in fact their individual rationality constraints are 
satisfied:
U2 = 0
t / 2 =  A0<?($ (0 1 ,02) ) > O
Because A 2 can only be of two types these ex-post payoffs are the same as in the 
previous cases, when the incentive compatibility of the efficient type was binding 
making him indifferent between telling the truth and claiming to be inefficient.
Note that the transfer 7/2 (•) and the quantities to be produced are apparently 
still dependent on both types, this is to be more consistent with what we have done 
so far and have a more homogeneous notation. In theory in this case the message 
space for the first agent when reporting to the principal is larger than before (it 
is equal to the one in the benchmark case), when, given the monitoring, A \ was
19 We assume that the action space of A i  is given by the set of possible sub-contracts he can offer 
to A 2 ■
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restricted to the message space {mi, 6 2 } (he had to report the true #2 )* Now the 
message space is in fact {mi ,m 2 } but the pooling contract implies that m 2 = 9 
always. As a consequence of this pooling contract the manipulation function is 
reduced once again to a function of one variable: 3> (9\, 6 2 ) — 0^.
If we restrict ourselves to non-random contracts given that agents can be only 
of two possible types then this pooling contract is the only possible deviation, no 
partial pooling (or semi-separating) is possible, and it is also consistent with the 
idea of concealing some information to the principal20.
We solve this game backwards so at the time A \ has to offer the sub-contract 
now the decision is more complex, first for a given grand contract he must decide 
whether to offer a pooling or a separating sub-contract. Then, given this choice, the 
principal, who will anticipate the agent’s behavior, will make her offer of the grand 
contract.
More precisely given a grand contract GC  =  {£,£, q2 , t ,q }, A \ will
choose the type of subcontract that maximises his expected utility51.
When offering a pooling sub-contract the expected utility of A \ when his type 
is 9\ is:
Up (0i) =  t ($  (0 1 ,5 )) -  (5 + 0x) q (*  { 0 u W j )  ,
the expected utility of a separating offer is instead:
=  v  (t(fc (0 1 , 2 )) -& q (* ( 0 i , § ) ) -  A 0 q ( i ( e 1 , e ) ) - e 1g ( $ ( 0 i , 0 ))) +
(1 -  v) (t (0  (0J.3)) - 0 q  (S (0 1 , 5 )) -  exq (<E> (0j,5)))
What A \ will prefer depends on the grand contract, which in turn will depend
20 Also indirect mechanisms are not of any use, any information that they would convey could be 
monitored by the principal.
21 With expectations taken over the possible types of A 2 since the offer is made before knowing 
the type of the second agent.
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on the goals that the principal wishes to achieve through the contract. The principal 
will want truthful revelation and a separating contract offer because this allows her 
to obtain the second best which is by definition the best she can reach given the 
asymmetric information setting and the monitoring.
As we saw before the constraints that need to be satisfied to obtain truthtelling 
by A \ are:
t — 2  0 q = £2 — 20<72
We can, without loss of generality, limit the analyses to the case of an efficient 
first agent because an inefficient one will receive his reservation utility regardless 
of the type of sub-contract offered. If the principal wants the first agent to screen 
among the different types of the other agent, it has to be that the separating contract 
gives A\ a higher expected utility than the pooling one, that is:
v V \  ( S . , 9 )  +  ( 1  -  v )  U i  ( 19 , 5 )  >  U p  ( f i , )  ( 3 . 1 3 )
where U i  ( 0 , 0 )  and U \  ( 0 , 0 )  are the rents earned by an efficient first agent who 
is paired with and efficient and inefficient second agent respectively when he offers 
a separating sub-contract and truthfully reports to the principal. While Up (0j) is 
the maximum utility that can be achieved by an efficient first agent that offers a 
pooling sub-contract, and it is defined as:
U'p (fia) =  maxt (4- ( £ , , 5 ) )  -  ( 0  + gx) ,  ($  0))
ti  — ( 0  9 + i/
1 - z /
Constraint (3.13) is in fact a moral hazard constraint, when designing the con­
tract the principal has to give incentives to the first agent to do her preferred action
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which in this case is offering a screening contract.
It is worth noting that Up (0i) could be achieved by truthtelling but also by any 
other report, the following Remark is of some help in this direction.
R em ark  3.1 I f  a Grand Contract is incentive compatible when the sub-contract 
offer is separating then it is incentive compatible i f  the offer is pooling and the 
expected utility of A \ is:
Having calculated the maximum a first agent can get under any of the two 
possible sub-contract offers we are now ready to check which will be the preferred 
choice given the optimal contract designed by the principal.
P ro position  3.3 When the principal can monitor the report o f the bottom agent 
into the sub-contract and the first agent is free to choose the type of sub-contract the 
optimal contract has the following characteristics:
• i f  v < i/** then the principal implements the following decreasing schedule of 
output q > q2 > qi > q defined by:
-  S '(q )=  20
-  S '{q2) = 0  + 0
-  5 '(§ i) =  e +  g + ^ A 0  
- S ' ( q )  = 2 S + v- ^ l A e
and it leaves the following informational rents to the first agent:
-  Ur (6,9) = Ur (0 , 6 ) =  A 0 q + (qr -  q)
-  Ur (S,B) = Ur (e,e) = o
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•  i f  v > v** the optimal contract entails some bunching and the implemented 
schedule q > % > q(=qi =q) is defined by:
-  S' (q)= 29
-  S '(g 2) = e + 9 + ^ A e
-  S ' { q )  =  W  +  - f a A B
and it leaves the following informational rents to the first agent:
-  Ux (5,5) =  A0&
-  Ui (5,5) = aeq
-  U i  (5,5) = U x (3,6) = 0.
If we take into consideration the possibility for the first agent of choosing a 
pooling subcontract then we introduce also some moral hazard constraint which in 
one case is binding. For low values of v, the moral hazard constraint is active and 
reduces the equilibrium payoff of the principal when she monitors. In this case the 
second best is not attainable anymore, but the optimal contract is still more efficient 
than the one without monitoring. There is no distortion at the top for two pairs22, 
qi is equal to the no-monitoring benchmark and q is higher than the one in the 
no-monitoring case. Informational rents for the first agent are lower than in the 
no-monitoring case and above those with monitoring but without the moral-hazard 
constraint. For high values of v the optimal contract does not screen between a 
pair of two inefficient agents and the mixed one in which the first agent is efficient 
exactly as it happens in the case of no monitoring, also quantities and rents are the 
same.
In other words, for any value of z/, the threat of deviation of the first agent in
presence of monitoring is effective. The possibility of him offering a pooling contract
22 This is because the first upward incentive constraints is not binding anymore due to the presence 
of the moral hazard constraint.
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to the second agent introduces an additional constraint that greatly reduces, and 
in some case nullifies, the gains obtained by the principal through monitoring. It 
is like if we were reintroducing some sort of incentive compatibility constraint, the 
one in which the principal gives incentives to the first agent to report that the other 
one is efficient. This constraint had disappeared from the program because of the 
monitoring.
3.5 M onitoring the sub-contract.
In the previous section we supposed that the principal could monitor the response 
by the second agent to the contract offer, more precisely she could listen to a report 
or observe the choice of a particular sub-contract but always without observing the 
contract itself. We now study what will happen in the hierarchy when the principal 
can observe the part of communication at the sub-contracting stage that comes 
from the first agent, she will therefore observe, perfectly and at no cost, the menu 
of contracts offered by A \ to A 2 .
As we noted earlier each possible type of A \ offers a menu of contracts that 
depends on his own type (in other words the offer is revealing), therefore the principal 
will be able to know the type of the first agent and she will obtain this information 
at no cost.
This monitoring does not directly affect the side-contracting stage so, if there 
is no reaction from the agents, the optimal transfers that induce participation and 
truthful revelation by A 2 are still given by:
3/2(01,5) =  0g (<t> (0J.0))
3/2(01,0) =  0 ? ($ (0 i,0 ) )+ A 0 q ($ (0 i,0 ) )
As we just said, these are observed by the principal that gets to know 6 \ with
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certainty, so there is no more asymmetric information between P  and A\ concerning 
the type of the latter, what is left is the asymmetric information (at the report stage) 
between P  and A \ vis-a-vis A 2 . The principal has to give incentives to A \ only to 
report what he has learned from the other agent.
Because of the information acquired by the principal, the first agent cannot 
misrepresent his type anymore and incentive compatibility needs to hold over two 
sets of two contracts each, instead of over the four original contracts (now only one 
piece of information needs to be reported). This is similar to what was happening 
to the possibility of misreporting the second agent’s type in the previous section, 
the corresponding Lemma holds.
Lem m a 3.3 When the principal can monitor the sub-contract offer a grand contract 
is incentive compatible i f  the following constraints are satisfied:
t — 29q =  t\ — 29qi (3-14)
*2 —(0 +  0)52 =  t - ( Q  + 6 )q 23 (3.15)
In other words the relevant (and binding) incentive compatibility constraints are 
only those of a coalition made by two efficient agents and a mixed pair with an 
efficient second agent. The individual rationality constraints for the first agent will 
be binding regardless of his type, moreover the coalition participation constraints 
will be binding when there is an inefficient second agent in the pair:
t - 0 q = 0 (3.16)
t i - ( 0  +  0)<7i =  0 (3.17)
We can think about this situation as if the principal could see through A \, we 
are now able to characterise the contract.
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P ro p o sitio n  3.4 When the principal can costlessly and perfectly monitor the side- 
contract offered to the second agent the optimal contract implements has the follomng 
characteristics:
• It implements a decreasing schedule of output q > % > qi > q, where the 
prescribed quantities are implicitly defined by:
-  S' ( q ) =  20
-  S'(q2) =  (0+5)
-  S'(§i) =  (0 +  0) +  t^ A 0
-  S' (g) = 20 + ^ 0
• The informational rents granted to the agents are the following:
-  t/i (0,0) =  Ui (£,?) =  u x (5,0) =  ca (5,5) =  o
-  U2 (e,e) =  A9qi
-  u2 (5,0) = A9q
-  U2 (5,5) =  U2 (0,5) = 0
It is interesting to note that at this stage the first two quantities are efficient, 
we observe the “no distortion at the top” condition each time the second agent is 
efficient, also the schedule of output is monotonic with respect to 6 2 . This is be­
cause when the principal monitors the contracts offer the asymmetry of information 
with respect to A\ disappears, in fact the principal can improve upon the second 
best, which by definition is the upper bound when you have two pieces of private 
information. For the very same reason, the first agent does not earn any informa­
tional rent, while because the second one earns a rent when he is efficient because 
sub-contracting happens as if no monitoring was taking place.
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3.5 .1  T h e a g en t’s reaction .
The first agent loses all the advantages coming from his private information thanks 
to the monitoring activity of the principal. A reaction on his part should go in the 
direction of concealing in some way that part of information that he transmits via 
the contract offer.
In order not to reveal any important information to the principal that observes 
the menu of contracts he can offer to A 2 two menus of two contracts each. He asks for 
truthful revelation from A 2 , but postpones the disclosure of his private information 
until the last stage (at least after he has reported to the principal). The second 
agent will know later the type of A\: before production takes place, he will find out 
what amount of the two prescribed by the chosen side-contract he has to produce. 
In fact the quantity that the principal demands is dependent on both agents’ types.
At this stage it is important to discuss what happens to the principal’s beliefs
about A i’s type when she observes the sub-contract offer. We are going to assume
that if the offer is not revealing then the principal does not update and the beliefs 
coincide with the prior probability distribution over possible types.
More precisely the sub-contracts take the following form:
SC  (0 1 ,®  =  {y2 (0 1 , ® , $  (0 1 , ® ;  0 1  6  6 } 
SC  (01,0) =  {t/ 2 (01,0),4> (01,0); 0i 6  0}
These two contracts are designed for an efficient and an inefficient second agent 
(respectively) but are conditioned on the type of the first agent as well, any type 
of the second agent will choose the contract designed for himself and wait until a 
later stage to find out exactly what price-quantity pair of the possible two will be 
implemented.
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Moreover, A 2 is aware of the fact that both transfer and quantity will be later 
conditioned on the type of A\ also, but at the acceptance and report stage he 
does not possess this information (and learns nothing from the sub-contract offered) 
therefore all his constraints, participation and incentive compatibility, will take an 
interim form. We, in addition, assume that the beliefs of the second agent remain 
equal to the prior if the sub-contract offer pools across the types of A \ .
In particular the relevant interim constraints are:
* 0/2  (0,0) -  eq (S (0 , 0 ))) +  ( 1  -  v) (1/2 (0 , 0 ) -  0 9  («> (0 , 0 )) )  =  0  (3.18)
^  0 / 2  (0,0) -  eq ($  (0 , 0 ))) +  ( 1  -  u) (y2 (0 , 0 ) -  6 q (<& (0 , 0 ))) =  (3.19) 
=  v (V2 (0, 0) -  Bq ($  (0, 0))) +  ( 1  -  „) (yj (0, 0) -  6 q ($  (0, 0)))
where (3.19) is the individual rationality constraint of an inefficient second agent 
and (3.18) is the incentive compatibility constraint of an efficient second agent.
The standard techniques employed to solve for the optimal side-contract would 
require, at this stage, to solve for the transfers first but from the equations above it 
is evident that our system is underidentified (we have four unknowns and only two 
equations), so there is some leeway in determining the optimal transfers between 
the agents. One possibility is to break up the interim constraints and impose the 
ex-post ones, so that we get an equal number of equations and unknowns.
A more formal justification comes from Mookherjee and Reichelstein [1992] that 
tells us how in this environment (linear utilities and constant marginal costs) we 
can equivalently implement this Bayesian allocation in dominant strategies without 
incurring in any loss for the “principal” (in this case the first agent). But requiring 
dominant strategy implementation amounts to breaking up the constraints as we 
have just explained above.
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Another justification for proceeding in this way comes from a subtle application 
of the theorems found in Maskin and Tirole [1990]: they prove that, in a informed- 
principal relationship with private values and quasilinear utilities, the principal is 
indifferent between revealing or not his information to the agent. This finding applies 
to our setting but some more considerations need to be done. If it is true that the 
first agent (the “informed-principal” in our case) does not gain nor loose vis-a-vis A^ 
by revealing his type, then the same holds for the latter. Therefore A \ guarantees 
to A 2 the satisfaction of the ex-post constraints even if he need not to; this because 
he is not trying to improve upon the contracting with A 2 , he wants to regain some 
power at the grand-contract stage and he does it by postponing the revelation of 
his type. Then, if the contract is offered as we proposed above and if the transfers 
are computed using dominant strategy, the second agent participates and truthfully 
reveals his information24 but the principal does not observe anything (and cannot 
force Aion his reservation utility).
The benefit to A \ from not revealing his type through the contract offer does 
not come from the additional surplus he gets from A 2 but from the increase in rents 
he manages to obtain from the principal when he is offered the grand contract.
For all these reasons we can then use the dominant strategy constraints, and note 
that they are the same ones calculated in the previous section where no monitoring 
was going on. If transfers in the side contract are the same, then also incentive 
compatibility and participation constraints for Ai, when contracting with P , are 
identical to the previous ones. This means that the optimisation problem that the 
principal solves does not change and the optimal contract is the one derived in 
Proposition 2. This enables us to state the following.
P ro p o sitio n  3.5 The principal does not gain in monitoring the menu of sub-contracts
24 This happens because the contract is identical in the transfers and quantities to the one that 
would have been offered if the principal was not monitoring. The only difference is that the revelation 
of the private information of the first agent is slightly delayed.
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that the first agent offers to the second one.
Ill
P roo f. If the first agent offers the following pair of side contracts:
S C  ( 6  i , 0 )  =  { 3 / 2 ( 0 i , 0 ) , 3 > ( 0 i , 0 ) ;  0 1  e e }
S C  ( 0 i , 0 )  =  {V2 ( 0 1 , 0 ) ,  $ ( 0 1 , 0 ) ;  0 1 6  0 }
then second agent does not learn the type of the first agent and his constraints have 
to hold in expectation, at an interim stage. The relevant ones are (3.18) and (3.19):
* f a  (0,0) - e q  (S (0,0))) +  (1 -  v) (3/2 (0,0) - e q  (*  (0,0))) =  0
v {V i (0,© - &q(* (0,fi))) +  (1 -  v) (V2 (0,0) ~ i q  (*  ( 0 , 0 ) ) )  =
=  * (y2 (0,0) - e q  (S (0 ,0 ))) +  (1 -  v) (j,2 (0,0) - e q  ($  (0 ,0)))
This constraints are satisfied by the ex-post transfers of our benchmark model. 
This leaves the bottom agent indifference between one setting or another. But 
if the sub-transfers are the ex-post ones then the problem that A \ solves when 
offering the sub-contract is exactly like problem (3.1) in the benchmark case. This 
implies that also the delegation proof constraints that the grand contract has to 
satisfy for the first agent to reveal truthfully the two types are exactly those of the 
benchmark model. Since the objective function of the principal is unchanged, due 
to the fact that her beliefs about the type of the first agent remain the prior after 
a not revealing contract offer, the solution of the optimisation problem that defines
the grand contract is the same. Quantities and transfers will be the same of the
benchmark case. ■
W hat we have learned from the above analysis is that, in a delegation model, the 
principal does not gain if she monitors, even at no cost, the menu of subcontracts
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offered by agents in lower levels of the hierarchy because of the reaction of the agent 
that looses the most from this activity. In fact, the latter manages to offer a sub­
contract that allows him to reveal his private information only before production 
takes place, and all this happens without affecting the welfare of the agent at the 
bottom of the hierarchy.
3.6 Concluding remarks.
We have seen that not every type of monitoring is equally beneficial to the head of 
a hierarchy because of the possible deviations by the lower levels. The monitoring 
that gives a higher utility as a direct effect, the monitoring of contracts, can always 
be nullified by an action of the agent that looses the most. Monitoring of reports 
can be beneficial in some cases, nonetheless it always triggers a deviation from the 
agent proposing the sub-contract in the attempt of concealing some information to 
the principal.
This analysis was carried out in the spirit of considering hierarchies as networks 
of agents that interact through contracts. We therefore wanted to take a closer look 
at the strategic interactions of members of hierarchical organisations and see whether 
strategic behavior could at least weaken some “results” that hold in standard one 
principal-one agent models.
Despite our attempt to generalise the analysis our setup was quite specific, it 
is probably worth extending the analysis to a different production function (some 
degree of substitution allowed) and to a setting where there is correlation between 
the types of the agents (the monitoring could even have some stronger effect).
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3.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1. If we substitute the optimal side transfers (3.3) and (3.2) 
into the first agent’s expected utility function (??) we get:
max£#2 [I7i] = v (t ($ (61, 6)) -  0q ($ (0U0)) -  A0q ($ (0i,0)) -  0ig ($ (0U6))) +
(1 -  u) (t ($ (£ ,5 )) - 6q (* (6u Wj) -  e i q  ($ (0i , 6)))
now we can check for incentive compatibility for any of the possible “coalition”
(there axe four of them).
Then the condition for the optimality of 3> (9,9) =  (9,9) is the following:
V (t (0,8) - ' m  (M ) -  A8q ($ (g,5)))+(l -  V) (t ($ (0,6)) -  (5 + £) ,  (® (6, 6))) > 
v (t (01, 02) -  20q (01, 02) -  A0q (* (2, *)))+(! -  v) (t ($ (6, 0)) - ( 0  +  0) q ( *  (£5)))
For $ (6,6) = (6,6) is:
(t ($ ( I Q )  -  20q (<& (0, 6)) -  A6q (6, 6) )+( l  -  v) (t (6, 6) -  (6 + 0) q (0,6)) > 
v (t (S (0,0)) -  26q ( i  (6, 6)) -  A 6q (6U 02))+(l  -  v) (t (6i, 62) - ( 8  +  6)q  (81, 82)).
For 4> (6,6) = (6,6) is:
(t (6,0) ~ ( 6  +  0)q (6, 6) -  A6q (4> (5,5)))+(l -  v) (t (* (5,5)) -  26q (0 (5,5))) > 
v (t (61, 62) -  (6 +  6) 9 (81, 62) ~ &6q ($ (5,5)))+(l -  v) (t ($ (5,5)) -  26q ($ (5,5))) 
For $  (5,5) = (5,5) is: 
v (t ($ (6, 6)) -  (5 + 0) q (* (5,0)) -  A0q (5,5))+( 1 -  „) (t (5,5) -  20q (5,5)) >
1/ (i ($ (5,£)) -  (5 +  0) q ($ (5, 6)) -  A6q (0U 02))+(l -  v) (t (0U02) -  20q (6U 02)). 
Simplifying we obtain constraints (3.4)-(3.7). This are the conditions for truthtelling, 
what any coalition gets in the contract leaves it better off than anything else they 
could have gotten misreporting their types.
Note that we have used first agent’s expected utility because the manipulation 
function is part of the side-contract that is offered before getting to know the second 
agent’s type, then incentive compatibility constraints are ex-post because by the
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time Ai reports to the principal he knows the true type of A<i- ■
P ro o f of P roposition  3.1. We can solve the system of equations of the binding 
constraints and obtain the incentive compatible and individually rational transfers: 
t =  2 0 q 4 - AQq
?2 = (S. + 0) 92 +  a 9qx +  i ^ A  ffg 
t 1 = ( 0  + 9 + ^ A 8 ) q 1 + i=%A9q 
t = 2 0 q
We can substitute them in the principal’s objective function and then maximise 
with respect to q, qi, % and q, we then obtain the decreasing schedule of output in 
the first part of Proposition 1.
But we need to ensure that monotonicity is satisfied, and qi > q is true only 
when:
5 + e +  ! ^ 4  A9 < 20 +  AS.
-  ( 1  -  v) ( 1  - u f
The above is satisfied when v < v* where v* is a root of:
( 1  -  i/ ) 3 -  v2 ( 2  -  x) = 0  
which is v* =  |  — \\J% — .38197.
If v  > v* the the optimal contract requires some pooling. This means that two 
different pairs will be offered the same contract t\ = t  = t and q\ = q = q and the 
constraints become:
t — 2 Qq =  0 
t — 2Oq =  t2 — 20% 
t2 ~ (Q + 0 ) % =  t — (O + 0 ) q
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If we solve for the transfers, substitute in the objective function and then max­
imise with respect to g, , % and g we obtain the implicit definitions of the second 
part of the proposition. ■
Proof o f Lemma 3.2. as in the case with no monitoring we want the grand con­
tract to be delegation proof, i.e. $  (0 i ,# 2 ) =  (#i, #2 ) but because of the monitoring 
the agent cannot misreport anymore the type of the second agent and the manipula­
tion function boils down to a trivial version of the previous one $  (#i, #2 ) =  ^#1 , #2 ) • 
Given this and the fact that each agent can be only of two types, for each possible 
coalition, the coalition they could mimic, it is uniquely defined (for example (#,#) 
can pretend to be only (9,9)). Therefore applying the same methodology of the 
proof of Lemma 1, the “coalition” incentive constraints are: 
t — 2Oq > t 2 ~  29q2
h - +  > t - ( 0  +  0 +  i£pA 0)g
h  ~  (Q + ty  $ 2  > t -  (0 + 9) q 
« -  (2 0  +  q > ti -  (20  +  ?) 91
It is straightforward to show that the only relevant constraints are the downward 
ones (namely the first two) that are binding at the optimum, the other two will be 
satisfied if the prescribed schedule of output is monotonic. ■
P roof o f Proposition 3.2. Considering the binding constraints (3.9), (3.10), 
(3.11) and (3.12) allows us to determine the incentive compatible and individually 
rational transfers, namely: 
t  =  2 Oq +  A9% +  A 0q 
t 2 = ( 0  +  0 ) <72 +  A&q 
ti = ( i  + e +  ^ A S j  §i + JjE^A0q 
t  =  2 &q
We can plot them in the principal’s objective function and then maximise with
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respect to q, qi, q2 and g, we then obtain the decreasing schedule of output of 
Proposition 2. ■
Proof o f Remark 3.1. Since,when offering a pooling sub-contract, A \ will always 
report 0 2 = 6  the relevant incentive constraint is the one of a pair (0 , 0 ) that is: 
t\ —  (0 + 0) qi > t  —  (0 + 0) q
which is for sure satisfied whenever the incentive compatibility constraint for 
the same pair under separating sub-contract offer is satisfied. In fact (3.6) can be 
rewritten as:
fl -  ( 0  +  0 ) qi > t  -  ( 0  +  0 ) <? +  j ^ A e ( q i - q ) .
Hence when the principal satisfies incentives constraints under separation, the 
utility of an agent that offers a pooling sub-contract is maximised by truthful report 
and Up (0 j) =  t\ — ( 0  +  0 ) q\. ■
Proof o f Proposition 3.3. The optimal contract, GC  =  {l,£,ti,<zi,£2 ,<f2 ,£,<z}, 
now it is a solution to a program that maximises the principal expected utility 
subject to the following constraints:
h  ~  ( 0  +  0 ) 92 ~  A 0 g > 0  
t - 2 9 q  > 0
t - 2 6 q  > t 2 -  29q2 (3.20)
t \  —  ^0  +  0  + -----—-----------A 0 ^ q i  >  t  —  ^ 0  +  0  +  —----------- A 0 ^ q
vU\ (0,0) +  (1 — z/) U\ (0,0) > U*P {91 ) (3.21)
where the last constraint is the moral-hazard constraint which rewrites as:
t — 20q — A 6 qi > t\  — (0 +  0) q\
It is standard to set the first two individual rationality constraint binding, then
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the second incentive compatibility constraint is binding as well. The problem is to 
decide which one between (3.20) and (3.21) is binding. If we consider the optimal 
contract without this constraint (the one described in Prop.2) then the binding one 
is (3.21), the moral hazard constraint. We can then solve for transfers and optimise 
with respect to the quantities.
The schedule is always monotonic for v < i/**, where v** is a root of 3—9i^+6^ 2 — 
i/ 3 =  0. If values of v are higher then the treshold we need to bunch together two pairs 
of agent and set t\ = t = t and q\ = q = q. Once we set these two quantities equal 
the moral hazard constraint is not the binding one anymore. After substituting the 
transfer in the objective function and maximise we obtain the quantities implicitly 
define as in the second part of the Proposition. ■
Proof of Lemma 3.3. The proof here parallels that of Lemma 2, with just 
minor changes. Now A \ cannot misreport his own type therefore the new version 
of the manipulation function is: $  (#i, #2 ) =  ^0 1 , 0 2 ^- The incentive constraints are 
uniquely determined as well: 
t — 29q > t \  — 29qi 
*2 -  (£ + 0) 92 > t  — (9 + 9)q 
ti -  ( g + 3 + I £ - A 0 ) $ i > t -  (e +  e +  ^ A < ? )2 
t — (2$ +  q >  t2 — (29 + <72
where the relevant and binding ones are the first two, while the other “upward” 
constraints will be automatically satisfied if the schedule of output is monotonic. ■
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Taking the binding constraints (3.14), (3.15), (3.17) 
and (3.16) (and remembering that participation constraints are binding in any state 
of the world) we determine the transfers:
• t = 29q +  A9qi
• *2 = (0 + 9) <72 + A9q
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• 11 =  (£ + 9) qi
• t = 2 Qq
We can plot them in the principal’s objective function and then maximise with 
respect to q, q\ and g, we then obtain the decreasing schedule of output of 
Proposition 4. ■
C hapter 4
The Irrelevance of Bargaining  
Power in Side-C ontracting.
4.1 Introduction.
When dealing with models of collusion under asymmetric information a stream of 
literature (see Laffont and Martimort [1997,2000]) has adopted the modelling device 
of the “ring-master” to design the side-contract. This player is a third party who is 
uninformed about the colluding parties’ private information and that offers them the 
collusive contract. It is recognised as an acceptable shortcut to isolate the impact 
of asymmetric information on collusion and to avoid more complicated issues, such 
as bargaining under asymmetric information and informed principal problems (that 
involves a signalling problem when the contract is offered).
Usually this benevolent (towards the agents) third party maximises the sum of 
the colluding agents’ expected utilities under the standard incentive and participa­
tion constraints. Other underlying assumptions are that the bargaining powers of 
the agents are equal (in the maximisation problem the utility functions enter with 
equal weight) and known to the principal.
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We believe that if the collusive contract is written at the expenses and “behind 
the back” of the principal it would be quite strange for the principal to know exactly 
the relative strength of the agents at the collusive stage.
We consider a model with one principal and two privately-informed agents that 
can collude with the aid of a collusion designer. We assume that the principal 
does not know the, potentially different, bargaining powers of the agents at the 
collusive stage. This assumption differentiates out model from the one of Laffont and 
Martimort [2000] where they analyse collusion-proof equilibria in an environment 
where the types of the agent are correlated.
The main result of the paper is that bargaining powers are irrelevant, and their 
diversity joint with the fact that the principal is uninformed about them do not 
affect the collusion proof equilibrium allocation.
This result is due to the fact that the information about the two agents’ types, 
and its transmission, is all that matters and the difference in bargaining power does 
not affect that information. We show that a Weak Collusion Proofness Principle still 
holds and that the constraints that ensure the equilibrium is collusion proof do not 
depend from the bargaining power at the collusive stage. Therefore any distortion 
and asymmetry that the ring-master can introduce with the side-contract disappears 
in the optimal collusion proof contract offered by the principal.
The only other work that has studied collusion issues with varying bargaining 
power is Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort [2002], in a model with supervision 
and collusion they also obtain a result of irrelevance but in a setup where there 
is only one-sided asymmetric information at the collusive stage and the bargaining 
power is known to the principal.
The result of this paper sheds more light on the power of the contractual instru­
ments that are available to the principal even when the agents are prone to collusion. 
Even if she does not know the true distribution of the bargaining power, she can
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offer a symmetric collusion proof grand contract and eliminate any asymmetry 
Moreover we provide a theoretical justification for the assumption generally made 
in the literature of equal bargaining power known to the principal.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the model. 
Section 4.3 solves the model and presents the results. Section 4.4 contains discussion 
and conclusions. All proofs are in the appendix (section 4.5).
4.2 The model.
The principal P  wants to buy a quantity q of final good. The first agent A  produces 
a quantity q& of the final good using the intermediate good qs which is produced by 
the second agent B. Production uses a Leontieff technology such that q = qA = Qb , 
in other words the production process is “componetised”.
Each agent has private information about his constant marginal cost 0*. These 
marginal costs axe drawn from a joint common knowledge distribution with discrete 
support © =  {0i,02} with A0 =  0 2  — 0i > 0, which we denote by:
P u  =  Pr (0A =  0 i and 0B =  0 i )
P12 =  Pr (0A =  0i and 0B = 6 2 )
P21 =  Pr {QA  =  02 and 0B = 0j)
P22 =  Pr (0A =  0 2  and 0B = 02)
Let p  =  P11P22 — P12P21 be the measure of correlation which is assumed to be 
non-negative. For simplicity we restrict the analysis to the symmetric case where
P12 =  P21 ±  0 .
Each agent’s utility function is given by:
Uk = tk -  0iq, k = A ,B  and % = 1,2
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where t k is the monetary transfer received from the principal.
The utility function of the principal takes the following form:
W  = S ( q ) - ( t A + tB)
with S' (•) >  0, S" (•) <  0.
In the paper we will simplify the notation as follows: we are using a double 
subscript to indicate the type of coalition both for quantities and transfers; the first 
digit refers to the type of the agent A  while the second one to the type of B, (e.g. 
<?2 i will denote the quantity produced when the A  is inefficient and the B  is efficient.
The complete-information social optimum,the first best outcome, is the following 
decreasing schedule of output:
S f (q*11)= 2 0 1 
S'(q'u) = & (q*21) = S' ®  =  0 i + 0 2 
S'{qh) =  202
4.2 .1  T h e  contracts.
The principal proposes a grand mechanism G to the agents, G maps any pair of
messages (m ^ ra # ) belonging to the product message space M  =  M a x Mb (where
Mfc denotes the message space used by each agent) into a triplet {q ,tA, t B}.We
therefore denote the grand mechanism by G =  {q (•), tA (•), tB (•)}.
At a subsequent stage an uninformed third party, T, proposes a side mechanism
S =  |0 ( - )  y V k  (0fce{,4,B}} to the agents to induce their collusive behavior.
Where 0 (0 is a collective manipulation of the messages sent to the principal and
yk (')k£{A,B} 1S a Pa r^ °f side-transfers. The third party is not a source of money and
therefore the coalition’s budget balance constraint must hold: Uk (0 A, 0 B) = 0
k = A , B
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for all (0A,eB) € 0 2.
Due to the Revelation Principle it is without loss of generality that we assume 
that S  is a direct mechanism. Therefore </>(•) and y k { ‘ )  {k G {A, B}) map 0 2 
respectively into the set of measures on M  and the set of balanced side transfers. 
Lastly, the third party maximises a weighted sum of the agents’ utilities:
aUA +  (1 -  a) UB}
An asymmetry could therefore be present at the side-contracting stage, even if 
the agents are equal, the payoff of A, for example, could be weakly more important 
at the collusion stage. In this way it is as if agent A  had more bargaining power 
than the second one.
The principal does not know the true value of a, she just knows the distribution 
of the parameter and its expected value a.
4 .2 .2  T h e  tim ing.
The timing of the overall game of contract offer and coalition formation is as follows:
1 . Agents learn their type.
2. The principal proposes a grand mechanism G. If an agent refuses it then all 
agents get their reservation utility (which is normalised to zero).
3. The third party proposes a side mechanism S  to the agents and a noncoopera­
tive continuation play of G if anyone refuses this side contract. If both agents 
accept the collusive offer, agents report their types to the third party who
1 This expression could be seen as a monotone transformation of the Nash product:
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recommends reports into the grand mechanisms and who commits to enforce 
the corresponding side transfers.
4. Reports are sent into the grand mechanism. Production and transfers take 
place accordingly.
4.3 The collusion proof equilibrium.
In this regulated duopoly framework,we are going to carry out an analysis similar 
to the one developed by Laffont and Martimort [2000]2, this type of setting allows 
a good understanding of the effects of collusion under asymmetric information on 
both allocative efficiency and the distribution of rents.
We study a model with one principal and two agents whose types are privately 
known and jointly distributed and, as it is now standard in the collusion litera­
ture, we assume that the principal has not perfect control over the communication 
technology so that she cannot prevent the agents from colluding.
Collusion is modeled as in Laffont and Martimort [1997]3 in a reduced form 
through the shortcut of the uninformed third party that designs and proposes the 
collusive agreement to the agents.
When agents cannot collude, an established result tells us that, in this correlated 
environment, the optimal mechanism achieves the first-best when the implementa­
tion concept is Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (Cremer and McLean [1988]). This is 
because ITs report (which is truthful in equilibrium) acts as a signal correlated with 
A's type and allows to condition his transfers on this information. The flexibility 
in transfers, due to the participation constraint in expected terms and the risk neu-
2 They deal with the provision of a public good, but the nature of the problems to be solved 
remains the same.
3 The 2000 paper complements and extends the 1997 one by highlighting the importance of 
correlated information as a direct casue of the strength of the coalition and the relevance of the 
collusive stake. Moreover in the more recent work they do not restrict the class of mechanism 
available to the principal to the class of anonymous one as previously done.
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trality of the agents, allows to “stochastically” and costlessly deter any incentive to 
lie.
Since the agents earn zero rent from the mechanism proposed by the principal it 
should not come as a surprise that they are willing to collude and coordinate their 
messages. Moreover this stake for collusion is created endogenously by this mecha­
nism ci-la Cremer-McLean that manages to successfully play one agent against the 
other by exploiting even the smallest correlation between their private information.
A weak collusion-proofness principle holds even in this correlated environment 
so that to fully evaluate the effects of collusion on the efficiency of the organisation 
it is sufficient to study only the mechanisms that are weakly collusion-proof. More 
precisely, G is weakly collusion-proof if and only if it is a truth telling direct mecha­
nism and the null side contract, Sq = |<£* =  Id , (y£ =  ^  J , is a BNE at the
collusion stage .4
We can therefore state the weak collusion-proof principle.
W eak C ollusion-P roof P rincip le  Any Bayesian perfect equilibrium of the two 
stages game of contract offer cum coalition formation G o S  can be achieved by 
a truthtelling mechanism offered by the principal such that the best response of 
the third party is to offer the null side-contract, i.e. no manipulation of reports 
and no side-transfers.
The intuition behind the weak collusion-proof principle is similar to that under­
lying the well known revelation principle: any equilibrium allocation of the overall 
game can be obtained with a direct grand mechanism offered by the principal him­
self. In the latter case the mechanism is designed in such a way that the coalition 
still forms but then finds it optimal to report truthfully, so collusion does not happen 
in equilibrium. In other words the principal offers a grand-contract that gives the
4 For a more rigorous analysis and a discussion of the equilibrium beliefs that sustain the equi­
librium refer to Laffont and Martimort [2000].
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agents the same equilibrium payoffs they would get through collusion. Agents are 
then indifferent between truthtelling and misreporting.
Since this principle holds we can solve the game backwards and focus at first on 
the direct side-mechanism that the third party offers to the colluding agents. The 
ring-master maximises the weighted average of the agents utilities with respect to a 
pair of joint reports to be made to the principal and a pair of side transfers, more 
precisely:
max (tA (4>ij) {<t>ij)+VA (0A,0B))
+  (1 -  a) (tB {(ffij) -  ejq (faj) +  yB (<9A, 0B))].
The solution to this optimisation will have to satisfy also the usual Bayesian in­
dividual incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints, because the 
third party is uninformed and collusion takes place under asymmetric information 
(only the relevant agent knows his own type). Note that the reservation utility in 
this case is given by the utility that each type of agent would obtain by playing 
non-cooperatively the grand contract.
From the first order conditions of the third party problem we can derive the con­
ditions for the optimality of the null side contract, Sq =  =  Id , (yk =  0)k€^A ^  j .
The following result introduces the collusion-proof constraints, also called coalition 
incentive compatibility constraints.
Proposition 4.1 A grand mechanism G is Collusion Proof i f  and only i f  there exists 
(e3 >ef0  ^ [0 >1 ) 2 such Idiat'.
t i i  +  *?i -  20ign > tA (eA,eB'j +  tB -  26iq (eA,eB} (4 .1)
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~ (& 2  +  $ 1  +  ^^egA^A gi2 
V P12 /
> tA (dA,0B)  +  tB (? * ,? * ) -  ^ 2  +  0X +  <Z (4.2)
2^1 +  ^21 — ( ^ 2  +  01 +  ^-^eg A^A qi2 X Pl2 J
> tA ('0A,0B) + tB (J A,0B) -  +  0i +  g ( / ,  0B) (4.3)
+  4 -  I 2 0 2  +  P 1 ? ( ^ + ^ ) A 0  I g22 
K 2 +  g f
>  t -4 (s '4,?5 )  +  tB (eA,e B)  -  ( 2 0 2  +  P l 2  ^  ~ ^ A 0 ) q (eA,e B)  (4.4)
P22 +  , , I2
v(? ,0 ) €©2.
These are the conditions for coalition truthtelling and are derived from the first 
order conditions of the third party optimisation problem. If a grand contract has 
to be collusion-proof then these constraints need to be satisfied, ensuring that the 
optimal manipulation function chosen by the collusion designer will be the identity 
function. These constraints define how high need the transfer of each pair of agents 
be in order to deter any incentive to lie.
It is worth noting that we cannot without loss of generality restrict our attention 
to symmetric mechanisms and equilibria, our aim being the desire to study the equi­
libria when some asymmetry is introduced at the collusive stage. For the moment 
then the two mixed coalitions, namely (0 i, 0 2 ) and (#2 , ^ l), have to be considered as 
two different ones.
For this reason we have two different discount factors eg and eg. They capture 
the fact that collusion takes place under asymmetric information and the third
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party has to induce truthtelling into the side-contract. Individual incentives and 
participation constraints are costly to provide and the true costs must be replaced 
by virtual costs, which are normally higher5.
It is important to stress that these discount factors depend on the Lagrange 
multipliers (the price of the constraints) of the third party problem and therefore 
can be “indirectly” chosen by the principal6. Moreover they are the only terms that 
depend on the expected bargaining powers a  and ( 1  — a).
Once coalition incentive compatibility constraints are characterised, the difficulty 
is to understand which are the relevant ones. We need therefore to derive the 
necessary monotonicity conditions for the implement ability of a schedule of outputs.
Proposition 4.2 For a weak correlation, p < (pi2 +  P22) (P12/P11)> tlie schedule of 
implementable outputs is decreasing (q\\ > q\2 > <721 > Q22) for all ^ I)2'
For a strong correlation, p > (j?i2+P22) (P12/P11), the schedule of implementable 
outputs is non-monotonic (qu > <722 > Q12 Q21) if and only if
4  («», 4 ) = 1 +  _  g u  4  <  0
P22 P12
i. e. for e \ and large enough; otherwise it remains increasing.
While a standard monotonicity condition is needed in the case of low correlation, 
the peculiarity of this proposition is that the principal can implement non-monotonic 
schedule of output if she chooses and sufficiently close to one in the case 
of strong correlation. This is because it can happen that virtual costs may not 
be ranked as the true ones7, collusion under asymmetric information introduces
5 This shows that already some distortions are due to the fact that at the collusive stage agents 
are asymmetrically informed.
6 In fact the third party maximises for any given grand contract and, for any optimisation prob­
lem, there is a set of multipliers at the optimum. The principal choses the grand contract also 
having this in mind.
7 When positive correlation is almost perfect the probability agents are both efficient is very 
large, therefore the incentive constraint of a 6 1 agent willing to mimic a 62 one is also very costly
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therefore some countervailing incentives in the problem8.
Before considering each of the two problems in more detail it is useful to write 
our constraints in term of ex-post rents of the agents, i.e. u4 =  t^j — Qiqij and 
uf- = t f j — Qjqij. We introduce eight new variables, one for each agent in each of the 
possible four states of nature, (e.g. tt^  is the rent enjoyed by agent A  when he is 
inefficient and the other agent is efficient).
We can now discuss which constraints are the relevant ones when looking for the 
optimal collusion proof contract in the low correlation case.
P ro p o sitio n  4.3 In case of weak correlation, p < {jp\2 + P 2 2 ) {Pi2/Pn)> the optimal 
weakly collusion proof grand mechanism is symmetric and the relevant constraints 
are the following:
2 u > u i+ U 2 + A 9q (CICia)
ui +U2 > 2 u + A9q +  ^-e$[ A9 (q — q) (CIC2a)
P12
pn u +  p12ui > p n u 2 +  P12U -I- A9 (pn q +  pi2q) (BIC)
Pi2 ^ 2  +  P2 2U > 0 (BIR)
Moreover it is optimal for the principal to set e\\ and both equal to zero.
These are all the constraints that have to be satisfied by a collusion-proof grand
for the third party from an ex-ante point of view. Truthelling in the coalition comes at the cost of 
large distortions of the optimal manipulation of reports. This may cause the costs of a ( # i ,0 2 } pair 
to be higher than those of a ( 6 2 ,  #2 ) coalition.
8 We are facing countervailing incentives when the agent has an incentive to understate his private 
information for some of its realisations, and to overstate it for others. Lewis and Sappington [1989]
and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [1995] have shown that the optimal contract is not monotonic in
the type of the agent and it may involve some bunching. Here the interplay of correlation and the 
collusion proof constraints cause the virtual types of the coalitions to be ranked differently from the 
true types.
9 A clarification on the notation: u  is the rent enjoyed by any agent which is part of a coalition 
of two efficient agent, u i  is the rent of the efficient agent in a mixed coalition while U2 is the rent of 
the inefficient one, finally u  is the rent of an inefficient agent when paired with another inefficient 
one. Similarly q  and q  are the quantities produced by a mixed pair and one made of two ineffcient 
agents.
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contract in the weak correlation case. The first two inequalities are the two down­
ward coalition incentive compatibility constraints, which basically say that an effi­
cient pair does not gain from claiming that it is a mixed pair and the latter does not 
gain from telling the principal that it is inefficient. The last two are the standard 
Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint of an efficient agent and the participation 
constraint of an inefficient one.
The first best cannot be obtained anymore due to the fact that the largely positive 
and negative transfers of the no-collusion setup cannot be used here because the 
would violate the coalition incentive constraints. Agents obtain some informational 
rents and, at the optimum, downward output distortions will be implemented. These 
distortions are the product of the conflict between coalition incentive and individual 
participation constraints.
When correlation is low it is optimal to treat equally the mixed coalitions and 
since the virtual costs represented the only asymmetry left in the model there is 
no problem in restricting attention to symmetric mechanisms. The schedule is 
monotonic implying that the coalition incentive compatibility constraints need to 
hold in the standard way mentioned above.
Note also that it is optimal to set both discount factors, eg and eg, equal to zero 
to save on the rents to be given to mixed coalitions. The binding collusion-proofness 
constraints take the form of those that we would observe had collusion been under 
symmetric information10, in this particular case virtual costs are equal to true costs.
We can now focus our attention to the case of strong correlation, where it is 
very likely that agents are of the same type. In this case the principal can obtain a 
higher payoff by implementing a non-monotonic schedule of output that significantly 
reduces the output for the very unlikely mixed coalitions.
The following result holds in the case of strong correlation.
10 This is because when agents’ collude under symmetric information they know each other’s type 
and there’s no need to give any rent to reveal truthfully in the side-contract.
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Proposition 4.4 In the case of strong correlation, p > (P1 2 + P 22) (Pn/Pn)) the 
optimal weakly collusion proof mechanism is symmetric and the relevant constraints 
are the following:
2 u > 2 u  + 2 (CIClb)
ui-\-U2 > 2u 4-A&q+ (q — q) (CIC2b)
P12
Pliu  +  P12U1 > p n u 2 +  P12U +  A9 (pu q +  p1 2q) (BIC)
Pi2 ^ 2  +  P2 2 U > 0 (BIR)
Moreover it is optimal for the principal to set and both arbitrarily close to 
one.
The first two constraints are the coalition incentive compatibility constraints, 
they are not the usual downward ones because of the countervailing incentives cre­
ated by the strong correlation of types. The last two are the standard individual 
constraints.
In this case the whole set of constraints that needs to be satisfied at the optimum 
has some peculiar features due to the asymmetric information at the collusion stage, 
and are both set very large11 in a way that changes the ranking of the virtual 
costs. It is exactly this that allows the principal to implement a non-monotonic
schedule of outputs. This is convenient because distorting a lot the quantity in the
very unlikely event of a mixed coalition does not lower much her expected payoff. 
Moreover when p \2  is very small, if q <  q, then the right hand side of CIC2b is 
very negative and as a consequence relaxes significantly the constraint. Rents for a 
member of a mixed coalition can be quite negative12.
Moreover also in presence of strong correlation the principal can gain by setting
the virtual costs of the two mixed coalitions equal, therefore the problem regains
11 Virtual costs are effectively different from the true ones.
12This is of course possible because the agents are risk neutral.
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symmetry and a pair of agents of different types will be treated in the same way 
regardless of who is the efficient member.
We are now ready to state the main result of the paper, namely that the bargain­
ing powers at side-contracting have no influence on the final solution whatsoever. 
In fact the term a  remained only in the coalition incentive constraints through e j 
and e^, but we then have shown that it was convenient for the principal to set this 
“virtual” terms equal so neglecting any asymmetry that could have been in place at 
the collusive stage.
P ro p o sitio n  4.5 In a framework of collusion under asymmetric information with 
correlation asymmetric bargaining powers in side-contracting are irrelevant.
P roof. It follows immediately from the above propositions. The set of constraints 
that a collusion proof grand-contract has to satisfy does not depend on a, the ex­
pected bargaining power, and both agents are treated symmetrically. ■
The irrelevance of bargaining power at the side-contracting stage may seem a 
puzzling result at first sight. Since one may think that in order to neutralise a 
coalition it is important to know how it formed and how the surplus will be split 
between members. Some more discussion on the concept of collusion proofness may 
help in clarifying one’s perplexity.
Collusion proofness is related to how information is transmitted to the principal 
via the manipulation function fixed in the side-contract, what is relevant for the 
principal problem are the two agents’ true marginal costs and we have shown that 
the conditions for a truthful joint report do not depend from the bargaining powers. 
How they would split the gain from collusion is not relevant for the principal, who 
in fact does not need to know the true bargaining powers to offer the collusion proof 
grand contract and avoid collusion on the equilibrium path.
Another intuitive explanation comes from traditional bargaining theory even if 
collusion proofness is a concept which belongs to the framework of non-cooperative
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game theory, where agents do only what it is in their interest to do. The only way 
for a principal to avoid side-contracting is to give the agents the same informational 
rents they would obtain if they were colluding and misreporting, so in a collusion- 
proof equilibrium it does not really matter how the gains from colluding would 
be split since there are no more gains. Therefore in equilibrium it is like in Nash 
bargaining theory when there is no surplus to split, then bargaining powers axe 
irrelevant and the outcome is given by the status-quo payoffs (the reservation utilities 
of the collusive stage, which axe the equilibrium rents offered by the principal with 
the collusion proof contract). With the grand contract the principal is able to choose 
these payoffs, which are then the reservation utilities at the collusion stage. What a 
collusion proof symmetric grand-contract does it to bring the agents on the Pareto 
frontier in the utility space, but it does so in a symmetric way so any asymmetric 
preference that the third party might have does not change anything in equilibrium.
4.4 Discussion and concluding remarks.
Our result has shown that, in a framework where agents can set up collusive agree­
ments once a grand-contract is offered, the principal does not need to know their 
true bargaining powers to deter collusion. If the agents secretly collude, it would be 
unreasonable to assume that the principal knew the exact terms of the deal.
We have shown that the assumption quite widespread in the literature of known 
and equal bargaining power does not affect the results and can be made without loss 
of generality.
We believe that this proves that the principal has one more “weapon” available 
as a contract designer, if she has no reason or advantage in considering the two 
agents as different13 then she can avoid to do it even if their relative importance at
13 The result carries through even in a more asymmetric framework with a risk averse privately 
informed non-productive supervisor and a gent, as in Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort [2002].
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the side-contracting stage is (or is believed to be) different. It is enough to treat 
them as equal and the internal incentives of the contract will make them achieve the 
same payoff in equilibrium.
This can be a useful tool in some applied frameworks. For example our model 
could represent a procurement problem, where the state agency is the principal. In 
this case it can happen that the two contracting firms are equal with respect to the 
specific project but very different in other fields, one could be a big multinational firm 
with a stronger power when deciding collusive agreements because of size, experience, 
ability or other exogenous reasons.
The same thing could happen in a regulation model, with the principal being the 
regulator and the two agents being firms in a duopolistic market. Maybe the firms 
are identical for what concerns the regulatory discipline in that particular market 
but in other fields they can be quite different and one may be stronger during the 
bargaining at the collusive stage.
In both cases the principal can re-establish the symmetry if she has no advantage 
in doing otherwise. If the utility function of the principal was different and the 
agent’s products were not complements then she may prefer to treat the agents in 
an asymmetric way. In fact when the principal does not gain from treating the 
agents differently she can avoid it via the offer of a symmetric grand contract which 
will establish the outside options. In this way she sets the minimum utility that the 
“weak” agent must get from collusion therefore giving him the strength to refuse 
too uneven side-contracts.
This powerful tool in the hands of the head of the organisation could find an 
application also internally, among employees. Think for example of an old employee 
and a younger one (or more and less experienced) that need to be considered equal 
with respect to performing a specific task, then also the collusion proof result will 
be symmetric even if when forming the “horizontal-elique” (Dalton [1959]) one of
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the two has more power.
This result sheds some more light on an aspect of collusion and side-contracting 
previously ignored, some others need to be studied more deeply: first of all the 
true role of the third party as a side-contract designer and the informed-principal 
problem that we are avoiding through such modeling device.
4.5 Appendix
P ro o f  of P ro p o sitio n  4.1. The collusion proof truthtelling constraints (also 
called coalition incentive compatibility) are derived from the first order conditions 
of the optimisation problem of the third party at the side-contracting stage. One of 
the condition for collusion proofness is that it must be best response by the third 
party to offer the null side contract and report truthfully into the grand mechanism. 
This is because it is the third party that, for any given grand contract and any pair of 
types, gives recommendation on how to jointly report information to the principal.
The principal does not know the true value of a, but she knows that its expected 
value is a  and since the objective function of the third party is linear in a  the 
following holds:
Ea [a ! / ' 4 +  (l - a ) U B]
IJ
[aUA +  ( l - a ) U B\
I J
Therefore, from the point of view of the principal, the ring-master solves the 
following problem:
max, \ (tA (faj) ~  9i(* (faj) +  VA (0 A, 0 B))
+  ( 1  -  a) (tB (faj) -  (Oj) q (faj) +  yB (i9A, 0 s ))]
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subject to the following constraints: 
obudget balance:
yA (eA, eB) + 3iB {eA, eB) = o; (bb)
oBayesian incentive compatibility constraints for agents A  and B  when they are 
of type 2 :
p n  [tA ((j>n) +  yA(0uOi)-0iq(<i>n)\ +P12 [tA +  va (61,02) -0iq(<f>i2)]
>  Pn [tA (021) +  va (62, 0i) -  9iq (02i)] +  P12 [tA ($22) +  VA (02, 62) -  6iq (022)]
(BIC-A)
Pn [tB (<f>n) + y B ( 0i , 0i) -Oiq((f>n )\ +P12 [tB (021 ) + y B  (62,61) - 0iq((t)2l)\
>  Pn [tB (012) +  pb (0i, 62) -  Oiq (012)] +P12 [tB (022) +  yB (62,62) -  Oiq (022)];
(BIC-B)
oBayesian individual rationality for both agents of both types:
Pn [t'4 W'ii) +  2M (0i . 0i) - 0i 9 W>n)] +  P12 [tA +  VA {81,62) -  #1<J (<Ai2)]
>tpu+m)U°{8i) (BIR-A1)
Pn [tD (011) +  Vb (81,81) -  Oiq (<£u )] +P12 [iB +  Vb (82,81) - 8 i q  O21)]
> {p n + V n )U % (8 i) (BIR-B1)
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P21 [tA (021) +  VA (02, 0l) -  02q ( 0 2 l) ]  +  P22 [tA (022) +  VA (02, 02) ~  92q ( 0 22)]
>(P21+P22)U%{62) (BIR-A2)
P21 [tB (0 12) +  VB (01, 02) -  02q (012)] +  P22 [tB (022) +  yB (02, 02) “  02? (022)]
>(P21+P22)U% (02) (BIR-B2)
Call p (9a ,9b ), $ a, Sb, vaii vb\, va2 and 1/52 the multipliers associated with 
the above constraints.
Even if we have substituted the true value of a  with its expectation a  this has 
not effect on the conditions for a maximum.
Maximizing with respect to y\ (•, ■) and y2 (•, •) yields the following:
P (01,0i) =  P11 [8 a +  vai  +  «] and p  (0i, 6{) =  pn  [8B +  vb \  +  (1 -  a)]
P  (01, 02) =  P12 [Sa  +  v A \  +  a] and p ( 6 1 ,92) =  p i 2 { v B2 +  (1 -  a)) -  p n 6 B  
P  (02, 0i) =  P21 {y A 2  +  ol)  -  pn 5A and p  (02, 0i) =  P \2  [ 8 3  +  v b i  +  (1 -  <*)]
P (0 2 ,0 2 ) =  P22 (vA2 +  a) -  P128A and p (02 , 02) = p22 {vB2 +  (1 -  a)) -  p\25B 
Maximizing with respect to 0n , 012, 021 and 022 we find the following conditions: 
0n 6 argmax {tA (0n ) +  tB (0U) -  29xq (0 n )}
<t>\2 € argmax j t -4 (<j>12) + tB (012) -  (Bi + 92 + ^ e % A 9q (012)) }
where =  5 +4 + ^ r
<j>h e  argmax { t4 (<j>21) + tB (</>21) -  (#i + 92 + ^ ( % A 9q (021)) } 
where e% = (1_g)+^ +, Bl-
022 G arg max I tA (022) +  tB (022) -  ( 202 +
P22+PP12
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Proof of Proposition 4.2. We are going to analyse the case in which a  G Q, l] 
this is just to simplify the analysis and it is without loss of generality with respect 
to the final results. Applying a revealed preference argument to constraints (4.1) 
and (4.2) we get:
*n  +  *fi “  201^11 >  tf2 +  *?2 -  201012
t\2 + 1\2 ~ (@2 +  01 +  ^-^e^Ao \ 012 > tii A tfi ~ (^ 02 +  01 + ^ :e^A0Nj qu 
\  Pl2 J \  P12 )
summing up these two inequalities we obtain:
A0 ( l  + —  (0 1 1  -  0 1 2 ) > 0
\  P12 )
which is satisfied if qu > 012.
Using (4.2) and (4.3) we obtain:
t\2 + t i 2 — (02 + 01 + ^■e^A0>\ 012 > t 2i +  t%i — f&2 +  01 + A0^ 021
\  P12 /  \  P12 J
t%i + t2i — (.O2 + O1 +  ^^e^A 0^ 021 > t i 2 +  t i2 — (02 +  0i 4- ^ :e^A0>j 012 
\  P12 J \  P12 J
summing up these two inequalities we get:
(eI  ~  €a) (912 “  0 2 i) > 0  
which is satisfied when 012 > 021 provided that > e%.
Finally consider the constraints (4.3) and (4.4) from the revealed preference 
argument we obtain:
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> i  «&  +  *  > 4  «? , -  ( * , + e h S ± 4 2 a , |
\  K 2  +  n t  /  V P 2 2  +  w f
summing these last two inequalities we get:
A e ( 1 + ------------------+ ®  _  W )  f e l  _  q22) >  o
y P12P22 +  e% {PllP22 -  Pi2) Pl2 j
which is satisfied if <721 > Q22 when the first parenthesis contains a positive 
number, and it is satisfied when <721 < <722 if the term in the first parenthesis is 
negative.
Define:
, I. ( J a  ( I_1_______ P 1 2 )   P11 ,a
V' ( A f  B )  ^  P12P22 +e^(pi 1P22- P 1 2 ) P12
this term is positive for low correlation and negative for high correlation and 
and sufficiently close to one.
To show it we need to investigate some properties of the ip (e^, e'g) on the rele­
vant domain. The function is in fact quasiconcave because the determinant of the 
bordered Hessian is positive, which is a sufficient condition for quasi-concavity and 
pseudoconcavity.
The bordered Hessian is given by:
H  =
Q   P12____ Pl2 (P12P22 -  6% (P11P22 ~ p j 2 ) ) _  m
Pl2P22+e£ (pilP22- P i2) (P12P22+C |(P 11P22- P 12))  Pl2
__________ Pl2___________________  Q Pl2 (PllP22 P12)
( P 1 2 P 2 2 ( p i  1P22 -P12 ) ) (P12P22+cl (Pl 1P22 ~P i2 ) )
Pl2 (pi2P22-e^ (p ilP 22- P i2))  _  £ n  -P i2(PllP22- P i2) ~ 2p22(pi 1P22~ p j 2 ) (pi2P22~C%(pi 1P22 ~P i2))
(pi2P22+el(pilP22-Pi2))  Pl2 (pi2P22+el(pilP22-Pi2) )  (pi2P22+ef (pilP22-Pi2))o
and its determinant is 2pnpf27------- P iir a -p fe—_____ The determinant is always
(P12P22+£5 (Pl 1P22 -P12 j )
positive because P11P22 — P12 = P that is positive by assumption. Being the ^  
function quasiconcave it will reach a it minimum at the extremes of the domain, 
therefore we study its positivity in those for points (remember that both and 
belong to [0, 1)).
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^  (0, 0) =  1, always positive.
(1, 0) =  1 +  always positive.
*  (i, i) =  i  +  P08* ^  i f f>< (P12 + P 2 2) §“ .
’®(0-l)  =  l  +  S ^ + ? - ^ - P ° sitiveif P <STT?-
So for weak correlation the monotonicity condition is <721 > 922- For strong 
correlation and e^  close enough to 1 the monotonicity condition is reversed, and 
therefore it must be that <?22 > 92 1 - ■
Proof of Proposition 3. Considering monotonicity and the global constraints 
we can restrict attention to the following:
uh  +  u\i  ^  w 12 +  u 12 +  ^ Q l 2
u12 +  U12 > u2l +  u2\ +  —  €AA 0  (912 -  92l)Pl2
u2l +  uh  > u22 +  u22 +  Aftg +  —  eg (921 -  q)P12
It is evident that the principal will set both and equal to zero in order to 
save on the rents to be given to the two mixed coalitions. But then if e j =  =  0
there is no more difference between the virtual costs of these two coalitions, namely 
{6\,62) and (02,0\) (there was already no difference in the “real” costs). Therefore 
there is no need to set different quantities and distort more one of the two, and: 
9i2 =  921 =  9*
Therefore also in this case we can focus on symmetric mechanism with t^i — tf1? 
ty.2 =  2^21 but also t{2 =  t^i = t\ and t^i = tf2 = £2, (it matters only wether one is 
the efficient or inefficient part of a mixed coalition).
Moreover the symmetry allows us to write just one IC constraint for an efficient 
agent and one IR for an inefficient agent. As it is standard in this literature we can 
temporarily neglect the IC for an inefficient agent and IR for an efficient one. ■
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P roof o f Proposition 4. When correlation is strong p \ 2  is so small that allocative 
distortions in this state of nature loose importance for the payoff of the principal. It 
is therefore optimal to offer a contract that implements a non-monotonic schedule 
of outputs.
The relevant collusion proof constraints therefore become:
u h  +  u h  > u h  +  u h  +  2 A 6 q
u 1 2  +  u 1 2  >  U 2 1  +  U 2 1  +  —  e A & d  (9 1 2  -  9 2 l )
P 12
U 2 1  +  U 2 1  >  u 2 2  +  u 2 2  +  ^  '£ %  (9 2 1  -  9 )
P l2
notice that this time the value of the difference (<721 — q) in the last constraint is 
negative, it is therefore convenient for the principal to set and as close to one as 
possible so that she can save on rents to the mixed coalition (where the first agent 
is inefficient). Moreover the principal has some interest in setting <712 =  <721 because 
then the second constraint above would be relaxed, but then again if it is profitable 
to make both mixed coalitions produce the same quantity then also their virtual 
costs must be set equal and the principal will set ej =  close to one.
Since both and tend to one the relevant treshold for defining a situation 
of high correlation is the one used in Corollary 1 , namely: ( p i 2  +P22)
Then as for the previous case standard method applies and one can restrict 
attention to IC constraint for an efficient agent and one IR for an inefficient one. ■
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